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CAN THE CEO LEARN FROM THE
CONDEMNED? THE APPLICATION OF
CAPITAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES TO
WHITE COLLAR CASES
*

TODD HAUGH

Ted Kaczynski and Bernie Madoff share much in common. Both are well-educated,
extremely intelligent, charismatic figures. Both rose to the height of their chosen
professions—mathematics and finance. And both will die in federal prison,
Kaczynski for committing a twenty-year mail-bombing spree that killed three people and
seriously injured dozens more and Madoff for committing the largest Ponzi scheme in
history, bilking thousands of people out of almost $65 billion. But that last
similarity—Kaczynski’s and Madoff’s plight at sentencing—may not have had to be.
While Kaczynski’s attorneys tirelessly investigated and argued every aspect of their
client’s personal history, mental state, motivations, and sentencing options, Madoff’s
attorneys offered almost nothing to mitigate his conduct, simply accepting his fate at
sentencing. In the end, Kaczynski’s attorneys were able to convince the government,
the court, and their client that a life sentence was appropriate despite that he
committed one of the most heinous and well-publicized death penalty-eligible crimes in
recent history. Madoff, on the other hand, with almost unlimited resources at his
disposal, received effectively the same sentence—150 years in prison—for a nonviolent
offense. Why were these two men ultimately given the same sentence? And what can
Madoff, the financier with unimaginable wealth, learn from Kaczynski, the reclusive
and remorseless killer, when it comes to federal sentencing?
The answer lies in how attorneys use sentencing mitigation strategies. This Article
contends that federal white collar defendants and their attorneys have failed to
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; 2011–
2012 Supreme Court Fellow, United States Sentencing Commission. The views
expressed herein are that of the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the
Supreme Court Fellows Program or the Sentencing Commission. Many thanks to
Benjamin Taibleson and Russell Stetler, whose comments and clarifications on early
drafts of this Article were invaluable.
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effectively use mitigation strategies to lessen sentences, resulting in unnecessarily long
prison terms for nonviolent offenders committing financial crimes. The white collar
defense bar has inexplicably ignored the mitigation techniques perfected by capital
defense attorneys, and in the process has failed to effectively represent its clients. After
discussing the development of the mitigation function in capital cases and paralleling
it with the evolution of white collar sentencing jurisprudence, particularly postBooker, this Article will present seven key mitigation strategies currently used by
capital defense teams and discuss how these strategies might be employed in federal
white collar cases. The goal throughout this Article will be to highlight new strategies
and techniques available in defending white collar clients and to enhance sentencing
advocacy in federal criminal cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who watched television, listened to the radio, or read a
newspaper during the late 1990s is likely familiar with the
“Unabomber” crime saga. Ted Kaczynski, a Harvard-educated math
genius and one-time Berkeley professor, gave up his life as a
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promising academic and moved to the woods in rural Lincoln,
1
2
Montana. There, he built his own home —the infamous shack —
and lived off “what he could grow or kill,” shunning the
technological world of computers, electricity, and even running
3
water.
Although he held odd jobs at various times, Kaczynski
4
apparently lived on just a few hundred dollars a year. His primary
vocation was “the disruption of the industrial society he had left
5
behind.” And in that endeavor he was successful. Over an almost
twenty year period, from May 1978 until his arrest in April 1996,
6
Kaczynski killed three people and injured twenty-nine others. The
tools of his destruction were always the same: package bombs sent to
individuals and companies he targeted as “techno-nerds . . . changing
7
the world.”
The manhunt for the Unabomber reached its crescendo in April
1996, when agents stormed Kaczynski’s cabin and arrested the target
of what had become the longest and most expensive manhunt for a
8
serial killer in U.S. history. Federal agents were led to Kaczynski by
an unlikely source: his own 35,000-word manifesto on the “evil of
9
modern technology” published in the Washington Post. Kaczynski’s
brother recognized his writing and directed the FBI to the Montana

1. For a detailed account of the events leading to Kaczynski’s capture, see
generally Robert D. McFadden, Prisoner of Rage—A Special Report: From a Child of
Promise to the Unabom Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/05/26/us/prisoner-of-rage-a-special-report-from-a-child-of-promise-to-theunabom-suspect.html?pagewanted=all.
2. Kaczynski’s ten-by-twelve-foot plywood cabin is now a permanent exhibit at
the Newseum in Washington, D.C. See Jacqueline Trescott, Unabomber Objects to
Newseum’s Exhibit, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081202660.html.
3. See Nancy Gibbs, Unabomber: Tracking Down the Unabomber, TIME (Apr. 15,
1996), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984392,00.html
(describing the desolate location that Kaczynski called home).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Adam K. Magid, The Unabomber Revisited: Reexamining the Use of Mental
Disorder Diagnoses as Evidence of the Mental Condition of Criminal Defendants, 84 IND. L.J.
SUPP. 1, 2 (2009), http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/84/84_Magid.pdf (describing
how one of Kaczynski’s victims lost sight in one eye, hearing in one ear, and part of
his hand); see also William Booth, Kaczynski Resists the Insanity Defense, WASH. POST
(Dec. 26, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/aron/
kaczynski122697.htm (providing further summary of Kazcynski’s crimes).
7. Gibbs, supra note 3; see also Magid, supra note 6, at 2 (describing targets that
included computer scientists, airline passengers, and a high-profile advertising
executive).
8. Gibbs, supra note 3.
9. Magid, supra note 6, at 2 (detailing how Kaczynski originally contacted the
New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle, offering to stop sending bombs if the
papers published his writings; the Washington Post ultimately published the
manifesto).

HAUGH.TO_AUTHOR3 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/10/2012 2:15 PM

[Vol. 62:1

shack, where agents found writings, bomb-making tools, and
10
“signature” components identifying the Unabomber’s handiwork.
Kaczynski’s bearded, half-mad face was splashed across cable news in
an infinite loop, and he was instantly labeled a brilliant and deadly
11
sociopath.
Kaczynski’s arrest was just the beginning of the saga. Over the next
two years, he battled lawyers (the government’s and his own), judges,
psychiatrists, and the legal system itself, fighting to defend himself as
a sane man in order to profess his seemingly insane view of the
world —a view that justified his crimes as part of a greater good to
12
protect society against the evils of technology. In the end, Kaczynski
accepted a plea agreement on the eve of trial in exchange for the
13
prosecution’s assurance to not seek the death penalty.
He was
14
sentenced to four life sentences plus thirty years. There is no doubt
Kaczynski will die in federal prison.
But while the details of Kaczynski’s arrest and almost-trial may be
well-known, what is less understood is the role his lawyers played in
sparing him from a death sentence. As one expert capital litigator
has said:
Kaczynski’s guilty plea to avoid a death sentence was . . . dependent
on tireless mitigation investigation . . . . The Unabomber case is an
important reminder that the development of mitigation evidence
may be as critical to resolving cases through successful dispositions
15
as to winning life sentences before juries.

Kaczynski benefitted from the expertise of a team of veteran capital
litigators and mitigation experts who spent hundreds of hours
constructing a sympathetic life story, which included compiling
extensive evidence of Kaczynski’s mental impairment, paranoid

10. See Gibbs, supra note 3 (describing how “[e]very bombmaker . . . develops a
hallmark: he may loop wires in a certain way, or set his switches at a certain angle or,
in this case, create his contraptions out of wood”).
11. See id. (reporting that Ken Thompson, a former FBI agent and domestic
terrorism expert, mused that “[t]he boys in the basement at Quantico are going to
spend years studying this case”).
12. See William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at
52,
57,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1998/03/16/1998_03_16_052_TNY_LIBRY_00
0015140 (explaining that Kaczynski’s Manifesto “urged revolution in the name of
Wild Nature”).
13. Id.
14. David Johnston, Judge Sentences Confessed Bomber to Four Life Terms, N.Y. TIMES
(May 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/05/us/judge-sentences-confessedbomber-to-four-life-terms.html.
15. Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb.
1999, at 35, 36 n.1 [hereinafter Stetler, Mitigation Evidence].
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16

schizophrenia. Kaczynski’s lawyers used what are now considered
standard capital mitigation strategies—extensive in-person interviews
with anyone associated with the defendant throughout his lifetime, a
multi-generational investigation of potential mental illnesses, the
development of extensive expert and lay testimonial and
documentary evidence, and the creation of a compelling anti-death
17
narrative —to secure a plea agreement that would spare his life.
From a sentencing standpoint, the defense of the Unabomber was an
18
incredible success.
Compare Kaczynski’s case with that of Bernie Madoff, another high
profile federal defendant who also captured the attention of the
American public. Like Kaczynski, Madoff was well-educated, at the
top of his chosen profession, and had he taken a different path, he
19
could have lived a life of considerable comfort. Instead, Madoff
committed the “largest, longest, and most widespread Ponzi scheme
20
in history,” which lasted an astounding twenty-two years and cost
21
Madoff used his considerable
investors upwards of $65 billion.
abilities to attract billions of dollars to support fictitious hedge fund
returns, used the money to live a lavish lifestyle, and then repeatedly
22
lied as investigators began uncovering the fraud.
Madoff, like
16. See Finnegan, supra note 12, at 54 (noting that no one doubted Kaczynski was
legally sane, but his lawyers thought by presenting his psychiatric classification they
could significantly mitigate his culpability).
17. See id. (describing how Kaczynski’s lawyers met with mental health experts
and also with family historians to develop mitigation evidence); Joseph Goldstein &
Marc Lacey, To Defend the Accused in a Tucson Rampage, First a Battle to Get Inside a
Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/us/
13tucson.html?_2&pagewanted=print (elaborating that Judy Clarke, Kaczynski’s lead
attorney, does not focus on her clients’ innocence, but rather on how to save their
lives by showing the jury a “mitigating social history” of her clients, including history
of abuse or mental illness that the client may have suffered).
18. See Beau Friedlander, The Legendary Lawyer Who Will Defend Loughner: Judy
Clarke, TIME (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,2041943,00.html (discussing the extraordinary abilities of Clarke, who
currently represents Jared Loughner, the shooter of Arizona Representative
Gabrielle Giffords). But see Finnegan, supra note 12, at 61 (suggesting Kaczynski’s
attorneys did him a disservice by forcing the narrative of mental illness when he
rejected that line of defense).
19. See, e.g., Les Christie, Peek Inside Madoff’s Homes and Boats, CNN.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/09/real_estate/madoff_homes_boats/index.htm
(last updated Sept. 10, 2009, 4:24 PM) (detailing Madoff’s many multimillion dollar
homes and yachts).
20. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/
30madoff.html?pagewanted=print.
21. See Steve Fishman, The Madoff Tapes, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://nymag.com/print/?/news/features/berniemadoff-2011-3.
22. See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS 374–75, 420–21 (2011) (documenting
the lavish lifestyle Madoff led and providing examples of his “flagrant lies,” such as
Madoff’s claim that he only had about twenty investors when in reality he had
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23

Kaczynski, was ultimately labeled a sociopath and is reviled by
24
millions. Also like Kaczynski, Madoff will die in federal prison. The
seventy-one-year-old Madoff was sentenced to 150 years — ten times
25
what would have been necessary to ensure he never left prison. The
26
judge called his crimes “extraordinarily evil.”
Where Madoff’s case differs from Kaczynski’s is in how Madoff
approached his sentencing. In contrast to Kaczynski’s attorneys’
hundreds of hours of work and tireless efforts, Madoff’s attorneys did
almost nothing at sentencing to mitigate their client’s criminal
conduct. They presented no evidence of any mental condition that
might lessen Madoff’s culpability, even though there was ample
indication of his extreme narcissism and lack of impulse control,
27
common diagnoses of white collar defendants. Nor did they present
any evidence of his extensive good works prior to committing his
28
fraud. In fact, Madoff’s attorneys presented no narrative whatsoever
thousands).
23. See Mona Ackerman, The Psychology Behind Bernie Madoff, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 18, 2008, 08:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mona-ackerman/thepsychology-behind-ber_b_151966.html?view=print (agreeing that Madoff had, at the
least, “sociopathic tendencies that bloomed in the proper environment”).
24. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 18–21, United States v. Madoff, No.
09 CR 213 (S.D.N.Y June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Madoff Transcript] (on file with the
American University Law Review).
25. Id. at 49.
26. Id. at 47. Professor Craig Haney has identified this type of description as part
of the “crime master narrative” that capital mitigation evidence is meant to combat.
Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital
Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 841 (2008).
27. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 435 (suggesting Madoff’s pattern of lies
indicates a sociopathic personality (citing MARTHA STOUT, THE SOCIOPATH NEXT
DOOR 6–7 (2005))); Marilyn Price & Donna M. Norris, White-Collar Crime: Corporate
and Securities and Commodities Fraud, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 538, 542 (2009)
(identifying personality characteristics of white collar criminals, which include
exhibiting “narcissistic tendencies,” the “fear [of] losing their status and position,”
and the lack of a “social conscience”); Fishman, supra note 21 (Madoff’s son
described him as a “bully and a gifted manipulator” and identified his extreme
narcissism). Recent statements by Madoff support such diagnoses. In letters Madoff
wrote from prison, he described himself as “‘quite the celebrity’” and said he was
“‘treated like a Mafia don.’” Joseph Rhee and Shana Druckerman, ‘Like a Mafia
Don’: Bernie Madoff’s Boastful Letter to Angry Daughter-in-Law, ABC NEWS (Oct. 20,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/mafia-don-bernie-madoffs-boastful-letter-angrydaughter/story?id=14777562. He also stated that the prison was “filled with ‘loads of
friends’ who respected him.” Id. However, he did admit being relieved because he
was “no longer in control.” Chris Michaud, Madoff Says He Is Happier in Prison than
Free, FOX BUS. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2011/
10/27/madoff-says-is-happier-in-prison-than-free.
28. See Fishman, supra note 21, at 3 (quoting Madoff as asking, “[d]oes anybody
want to hear that I had a successful business and did all these wonderful things for
the industry?”). By all accounts, Madoff was a well-regarded financier who gave
millions to charities even before his Ponzi scheme began in the 1990s. See Charity
Caught Up in Wall Street Ponzi Scandal, FOX NEWS (Dec. 13. 2008),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,466665,00.html (recognizing that in 1998,
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to offset what even they called the “heart-wrenching stories of loss
29
and deprivation” suffered by his victims. Madoff’s attorneys even
failed to offer letters of support from family and friends, a basic
30
mitigation technique used in most white collar cases. His attorneys
offered only a dry statistical breakdown of federal sentencing data to
31
argue for a non-disparate sentence and a plea allocution that
explained the operation of his crime without explaining why he
32
deserved leniency. In the end, Madoff turned to the courtroom
33
gallery and offered only, “I am sorry. I know that doesn’t help you.”
The judge sentenced Madoff to the maximum sought by the
government—100 years more than recommended by the probation
department—noting that sentencing a seventy-one-year-old to 150
34
years was “largely, if not entirely, symbolic.”
the Madoff family established its charity, the Madoff Family Foundation, and for
many years gave multi-million dollar donations to many New York charities).
29. Letter from Ira Lee Sorkin to Hon. Denny Chin (June 22, 2009) (on file with
the American University Law Review).
30. Judge Denny Chin specifically mentioned the lack of supporting letters
during Madoff’s sentencing hearing, stating that “[t]he absence of such support is
telling.” Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 46. Compare Benjamin Weiser, Judge
Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-histhoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the judge
received 450 emails and letters from victims of Madoff hoping to see him punished),
with Ron Kampeas, Sharansky, 173 Others Plead Leniency for Libby, JWEEKLY.COM (June 8,
2007),
http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/32649/sharansky-173-others-pleadleniency-for-libby/ (summarizing the case of Scooter Libby, convicted of obstructing
the investigation into the leaked name of covert CIA operative Valerie Plame, who
submitted 174 letters appealing for leniency when facing just a thirty-seven-month
sentence).
31. Of course, this argument was not compelling given there had never been a
Ponzi scheme of this magnitude.
32. See Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 31–38 (noting that no letters were
submitted attesting to Madoff’s good character or providing insight into his
motivations).
33. Id. at 38. Judge Chin has remarked that he did not believe Madoff was
genuinely remorseful. Weiser, supra note 30. It should be obvious that Madoff’s case
is not exactly typical. Most white collar cases are not so extreme—the frauds are
smaller, the public outcry is less, some mitigating arguments are made at sentencing,
and the punishment is not so severe. The sharp relief Madoff’s case offers from the
typical, however, is precisely why it is a compelling example from which to draw.
That Madoff’s attorneys used so few mitigation strategies and their client was
sentenced so drastically demonstrates the dangers in ignoring the lessons of
mitigation experts.
34. Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 47. Judge Chin has recounted that he
considered a twenty- to twenty-five-year sentence, but ultimately rejected it as “just
way too low.” Weiser, supra note 30. He said sentencing Madoff to any additional
years would be “purely symbolic,” yet he felt “symbolism was important . . . given the
enormity of Mr. Madoff’s crimes.” Id. Judge Chin determined that sentencing
Madoff to anything less than 150 years would be perceived as showing mercy, and
“[f]rankly, that was not the message [he] wanted to be sent.” Id. Ultimately, Judge
Chin said he feels “comfortable with the decision [he] reached.” Hon. Denny Chin,
Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium: Sentencing Law:
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So what can be learned from comparing the Madoff and Kaczynski
cases—in which a first-time white collar offender charged with a
nonviolent financial crime (albeit a massive one) receives a sentence
functionally equivalent to that of a serial killer who terrorized the
nation for twenty years? Is there a lesson for the CEO from the case
of the condemned?
This Article contends that white collar defendants and their
counsel can learn much by understanding how capital defense
attorneys approach sentencing mitigation. Federal white collar
defense attorneys have failed to learn—indeed, have ignored—the
lessons of sentencing mitigation employed so effectively by capital
litigators and their teams of mitigation experts. Most white collar
defense attorneys approach sentencing as Madoff’s attorneys did,
with little imagination and even less proven strategies to mitigate
their client’s conduct. This approach ignores the considerable
35
mitigation arguments allowed under United States v. Booker and its
progeny, and does a disservice to white collar defendants by exposing
them to excessive sentences imposed in the name of “symbolism.”
Effective sentencing advocacy demands that white collar defense
attorneys “take a lesson from their comrades in the realm of capital
litigation: these attorneys have repeatedly demonstrated how to save
clients’ lives through conducting a thorough investigation into the
client’s social and psychological history and producing evidence that
36
mitigates the crimes committed.”
While white collar sentencing will not change overnight, the goal
of this Article is to highlight new strategies available in defending
white collar clients based on proven capital mitigation techniques.
Part I discusses the development of the mitigation function in capital
cases. Part II discusses the parallel arc of federal sentencing
jurisprudence, focusing particularly on the state of white collar
sentencing post-Booker. Finally, Part III presents seven key mitigation
strategies currently used by capital mitigation experts and discusses
how these strategies might be effectively employed in federal white
collar cases.

Rhetoric & Reality (Nov. 4, 2011) (notes on file with author); see also Denny Chin,
Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1574–75 (2012)(providing
further insight into Judge Chin’s reasoning behind imposing such a lengthy
sentence).
35. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that provisions of the then-mandatory United
States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and excising those
provisions to create an advisory sentencing guidelines regime).
36. Alan Ellis et al., Litigating in a Post-Booker World, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2005, at
24, 31 [hereinafter Ellis et al., Litigating].
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MITIGATION FUNCTION IN CAPITAL
CASES

Understanding how federal white collar defendants and attorneys
can learn from their capital defense counterparts begins with
understanding capital mitigation. It should come as no surprise that
most attorneys, even experienced defense attorneys, have no concept
of how mitigation evidence is developed and used in capital cases.
Why would they? Aside from a small cadre of nationally-recognized
capital defense experts, a criminal defense attorney will probably
37
never try a capital case and never put on mitigation evidence. That
is especially true for white collar defense counsel. Therefore, it is
necessary to first provide an overview of the development of the
mitigation function in capital cases in order to dispel the “mystery of
38
mitigation.”
A. The Legal Framework of Capital Mitigation
Capital mitigation as we know it today, loosely defined as “the
empathy-evoking evidence that attempts to humanize the accused
39
killer in death penalty cases,” begins with the modern era of the
death penalty. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Furman v.
40
Georgia, addressing whether states’ discretionary death penalty
statutes, which gave juries the decision to impose death sentences,
41
were constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In a 5-4 decision, with all the Justices writing separately, the Court
37. See Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 713
(2008) [hereinafter O’Brien, When Life Depends on It] (stating that mitigation is
probably the least understood concept in capital sentencing); Russell Stetler, The
Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Response in Capital
Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. SOC. CHANGE 237, 237 (2008) [hereinafter Stetler, Mystery of
Mitigation] (“Indeed, in twenty years of federal death penalty prosecutions, very few
judges have presided over more than one penalty proceeding. Some of the most
experienced public defenders specializing in capital cases have presented mitigating
evidence only a handful of times over their long careers.”).
38. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 237 (explaining that capital
mitigation is the process by which an attorney attempts to humanize an accused
killer).
39. Id.
40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 651–52
(2004) (mandatory death penalty statutes had been phased out in large part by
1963). The Supreme Court had earlier held that discretionary death penalty statutes
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but had not addressed whether they
violated the Eighth Amendment. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185
(1971) (stating that an accused rights were not violated by the imposition of a death
sentence), vacated, Crampton v. Ohio, 92 S. Ct. 2873 (1972).
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held that all capital statutes then in place violated the Constitution.
The consensus of the fractured opinion was that juries could not
constitutionally be given unfettered discretion, which was often
exercised arbitrarily, to determine which defendants were sentenced
43
to death. The dramatic effect of Furman was to halt the execution of
44
every person on death row at the time.
In response, state legislatures drafted new death penalty statutes,
45
beginning a thirty-year “work-in-progress.” Many of these statutes
gave capital juries “guided discretion,” meaning they instructed jury
members to consider specific aggravating and mitigating factors
46
during sentencing, as a way to comply with Furman. In Gregg v.
47
Georgia, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s guided
discretion statute, thereby reinstating the death penalty in a portion
48
of states. Justice Stewart, writing the plurality opinion, held that
Georgia’s statute, which directed the jury’s attention to “the specific
49
circumstances of the crime,” did not violate the Eighth Amendment
50
because it gave the jury “clear and objective standards” to consider.
Although the opinion hinted at the importance of mitigation
evidence, the Court gave little guidance as to what the mitigation
function encompassed. Professor Craig Haney has explained that
Gregg merely adopted the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) listing of
aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed without any
practical or theoretical elaboration:
Justice Stewart . . . noted, with a degree of understatement, that the
standards to be considered by a jury in determining whether to
impose a death sentence “are by necessity somewhat general.”
There was no explanation or discussion—in the MPC or by the
Court—about exactly what the concept of aggravation or

42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
43. See id. at 239–40, 256–57 (noting that the statute at issue, which imposed the
death penalty on defendants convicted of murder and rape, leads to discrimination
by jurors that is “not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is
implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments”); Kirchmeier, supra note 41,
at 652 (explaining that the arbitrary imposition of death was of great concern for the
majority of the Justices).
44. See Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 652 (explaining that some state legislatures
reverted back to mandatory death sentencing statutes in the wake of Furman, while
others sought to limit the sentencer’s discretion through guided discretion statutes).
45. Haney, supra note 26, at 845.
46. Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 653.
47. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
48. Haney, supra note 26, at 845; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(upholding guided discretion death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (same).
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197–98 (plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 98 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
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mitigation meant, why they were important to include in a
constitutional scheme of death penalty decision-making, or
precisely how capital jurors were supposed to use them in choosing
51
between life and death.

Gregg did, however, specifically approve of the jury’s consideration
of the “circumstances of the crime and the criminal,” mentioning that
“special facts about th[e] defendant that [might] mitigate against
imposing capital punishment” included the defendant’s youth, his
cooperation with the police, and his emotional state during the
52
commission of the crime. Albeit vaguely, Gregg had planted the first
seeds concerning the use of mitigation evidence in capital cases.
53
54
In Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, the concept
of mitigation in capital cases began to grow. In Woodson, Justice
Stewart, again writing for a plurality, struck down a mandatory death
penalty statute, stating that the Eighth Amendment “requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
55
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”
The mandatory statute in Roberts, although more narrowly drafted,
56
was struck down for the same reasons.
Neither case, however,
specified what individual offender characteristics should be
considered, or why and how the “diverse frailties of humankind”
alluded to in the Woodson opinion might be employed as mitigating
57
evidence.
Yet within two years, the concept of mitigation had firmly taken
58
hold in death penalty jurisprudence. In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court
invalidated Ohio’s death penalty statute, which “narrowly limit[ed]
the sentencer’s discretion to consider the circumstances of the crime
59
and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors.”
In what became known as the Lockett doctrine, Chief Justice Burger
significantly broadened the scope of potential mitigation evidence

51. Haney, supra note 26, at 845–46 (footnote omitted).
52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
53. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
54. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
55. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
56. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335–36 (stating that “Louisiana’s mandatory death
sentence law employs a procedure that was rejected by that State’s legislature 130
years ago and that subsequently has been renounced by legislatures and juries in
every jurisdiction in this Nation” (footnote omitted)).
57. Haney, supra note 26, at 846 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
58. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
59. Id. at 589.
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60

available at trial.
After recognizing the long history of
individualized sentencing in the United States, the Court held there
could be almost no limits on mitigating evidence offered by a
61
defendant in a capital case.
“[T]he sentencer . . . [can]not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
62
death.” The Court struck down the Ohio statute because it limited
mitigation to questions of whether the defendant had facilitated the
offense, whether it was unlikely that the defendant would have
committed the crime but for some strong provocation, and whether
63
the offense was primarily the product of a mental deficiency.
Although the Lockett doctrine was a significant advance in death
penalty jurisprudence because it ensured that capital sentencers
would be in “‘possession of the fullest information possible
64
concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,’” the decision
still did not explain what actually constituted mitigation evidence or
how it could be effectively used.
While Lockett had certainly “made up in breadth what [the Court’s
explanation of capital mitigation] lacked in clarity,” the decision’s
failure to specify what comprised mitigation evidence or its
65
boundaries was problematic. “In essence, Lockett told trial courts to
allow evidence to be admitted that . . . might serve as the basis of a
sentence less than death. But it did not suggest how or why [the
sentencer] could or should actually be inclined by the evidence to
66
lean . . . .” This lack of clarity caused “unevenness” in how capital
67
Some did
defense attorneys approached the use of mitigation.
nothing, arguing the same way and with the same evidence as they
68
had during pre-Lockett cases. Others, however, thought “expansively
60. See Haney, supra note 26, at 846–47 (noting that besides elaborating on the
great breadth of information the jury was to possess, the Court failed to provide
substantive guidelines for mitigation).
61. See id. at 847.
62. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis omitted and added).
63. See id. at 593–94 (summarizing how the trial judge determined he had no
alternative but to impose a death sentence under the statute).
64. Id. at 603 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
65. Haney, supra note 26, at 846 (elaborating that Justice Stewart’s opinion “did
not specify which diverse frailties he had in mind, or why and how he believed those
frailties might generate compassion or constitute mitigation”).
66. Id. at 847.
67. See id. at 848 (stating that many attorneys simply did not know what would
now constitute mitigating evidence).
68. See id. (explaining that many defense attorneys could not figure out which
parts of a defendant’s past could be mitigating to a juror, while others did not
present mitigation evidence at all).
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and creatively” about the issue of mitigation and began exploring
every tool available to mitigate their client’s conduct, including
developing arguments based on advancements in psychology,
69
psychiatry, and physiology.
Lockett, therefore, invigorated the
imaginations of at least some dedicated capital litigators.
In a series of decisions after Lockett, the Court began to flesh out
70
the parameters of mitigation. In Skipper v. South Carolina, the Court
struck down a statute that excluded mitigation evidence detailing the
defendant’s behavior after the offense, such as the defendant’s
71
72
adjustment to prison. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court held that
mitigation evidence related to the defendant’s violent upbringing
73
also could not be excluded at trial. The Court furthered this line of
74
reasoning in California v. Brown, stating that evidence of the
defendant’s background was particularly relevant in death penalty
75
76
cases. And in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that a capital jury
must be given instructions allowing it to consider mitigating evidence
77
of the defendant’s mental retardation and childhood abuse. The
Penry decision solidified the validity and scope of mitigation —the
Court now widely recognized a capital defendant’s Eighth
Amendment right to present evidence of any mitigating factor that
would allow the jury a “‘reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
78
background, character, and crime.’”
The next important development in capital mitigation came ten
79
years later in Williams v. Taylor. Although it was clear that mitigation
69. Id.
70. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
71. See id. at 5 (“Consideration of a defendant’s past conduct as indicative of his
probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal
sentencing: ‘any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable
future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to
impose.’” (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976))).
72. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
73. See id. at 116 (“[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.”).
74. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
75. See id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[E]vidence about the defendant’s
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society,
that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse.”).
76. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
77. See id. at 322, 340 (concluding that evidence of mental retardation and
childhood abuse is relevant in determining moral culpability and should be
considered when imposing sentences).
78. Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
184 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
79. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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evidence could not be excluded from a capital sentencer’s penalty
determination, it was less clear whether the law required that evidence
80
be presented on a capital defendant’s behalf. Williams answered the
question affirmatively, finding that capital counsel violated a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
81
by failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence.
In
Williams, the Court admonished defense counsel’s failure to seek
records that would have demonstrated the defendant’s brutal
upbringing, nonviolent nature, borderline mental retardation, and
82
positive rehabilitation.
Williams established that not only were
capital defense attorneys required to present any available mitigation
evidence, they were required to conduct a thorough investigation
into a defendant’s background and social history to uncover evidence
83
that may prove effective in mitigating a client’s sentence.
84
Two subsequent cases further clarified both the “[c]ritical role”
of mitigating background evidence and the necessary scope of
80. See id. at 370–74 (recounting the lower courts’ conflicting application of the
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which
determined whether counsel’s failure to submit mitigating evidence violated the
Sixth Amendment).
81. See id. at 398–99 (holding that counsel’s failure to unearth his client’s social
history records to use as mitigating evidence violated the Constitution).
82. In a chilling passage, Justice Stevens described the type of mitigating
evidence the defendant’s attorneys should have found if they had conducted a
thorough investigation:
The record establishes that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the
sentencing] phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial. They
failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive
records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood . . . . Had
they done so, the jury would have learned that Williams’ parents had been
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that
Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had
been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years
during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster
home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been
returned to his parents’ custody.
Counsel failed to introduce available evidence that Williams was
“borderline mentally retarded” and did not advance beyond sixth grade in
school.
They failed to seek prison records recording Williams’
commendations for helping to crack a prison drug ring and for returning a
guard’s missing wallet, or the testimony of prison officials who described
Williams as among the inmates “least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or
provocative way.” Counsel failed even to return the phone call of a certified
public accountant who had offered to testify that he had visited Williams
frequently when Williams was incarcerated as part of a prison ministry
program, that Williams “seemed to thrive in a more regimented and
structured environment,” and that Williams was proud of the carpentry
degree he earned while in prison.
Id. at 395–96.
83. Id. at 393.
84. Haney, supra note 26, at 851.
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85

defense counsel’s investigation. In Wiggins v. Smith, the Court found
capital counsel ineffective when they made a “strategic” decision to
discontinue an investigation into the defendant’s personal
86
background, despite evidence of the defendant’s extreme abuse.
The Court faulted the attorneys’ half-hearted investigatory approach,
asserting that counsel “acquired only rudimentary knowledge of
[their client’s] history from a narrow set of sources” and ignored
their client’s “medical history, educational history, employment and
training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile
87
correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.”
Wiggins “acknowledged—in a clear and definitive way—the
importance of developing and, when appropriate, presenting a
88
89
mitigating social history.” Rompilla v. Beard furthered the holding
in Wiggins, finding defense counsel ineffective for failing to fully
investigate a defendant’s social history, even when the defendant
insisted his background was unexceptional and tried to obstruct his
90
attorneys’ investigative efforts.
Rompilla thus capped the Court’s thirty-year “work-in-progress”
91
surrounding capital mitigation. In three decades, “the Court had
moved from merely mentioning mitigation (without defining the
85. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
86. Id. at 516–17, 526.
87. Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
88. Haney, supra note 26, at 851.
89. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
90. See id. at 391. If counsel would have investigated further, they would have
found:
Rompilla’s parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly. His
mother drank during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers
eventually developed serious drinking problems. His father, who had a
vicious temper, frequently beat Rompilla’s mother, leaving her bruised and
black-eyed, and bragged about his cheating on her. His parents fought
violently, and on at least one occasion his mother stabbed his father. He was
abused by his father who beat him when he was young with his hands, fists,
leather straps, belts and sticks. All of the children lived in terror. There
were no expressions of parental love, affection or approval. Instead, he was
subjected to yelling and verbal abuse. His father locked Rompilla and his
brother Richard in a small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement
filled. He had an isolated background, and was not allowed to visit other
children or to speak to anyone on the phone. They had no indoor
plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children
were not given clothes and attended school in rags.
Id. at 391–92 (citations omitted).
91. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to individualized sentencing in the
most recent term. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (“[I]ndividualized
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to
consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalties
[life without the possibility of parole] for juveniles.”). However, it remains to be
seen whether the decision will lead to an expansion of protection for non-juvenile
offenders facing sentences of life without parole.
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term or even commenting that none had been presented in the cases
it was deciding) to reversing a death sentence on the basis of
counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate background and social
92
history investigation.”
The constitutional requirements of
presenting mitigation evidence were established, but it remained to
be seen how capital litigators would implement the mitigation
function in practice.
B. The ABA Guidelines and the Institutionalized Role of Capital Mitigation
Soon after the Court’s pronouncement in Williams that capital
defense counsel were required to investigate and present mitigation
evidence, the American Bar Association (ABA) began updating its
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
93
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”).
While the
previous version of the ABA Guidelines provided that investigations
into mitigating evidence “should comprise efforts to discover all
reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any
94
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor,”
the revisions specifically addressed the newly-established investigation
95
requirement.
The revised ABA Guidelines were also a direct
response to cases in which defense counsel, despite the Williams
ruling, had failed to conduct a thorough and independent
96
investigation of the defendant’s background and social history. The
ABA determined that capital attorneys knew the importance of

92. Haney, supra note 26, at 855. However, capital counsel’s strategic decision to
not introduce mitigation evidence is not ineffective assistance so long as counsel
demonstrates that he completed an adequate investigation. See Wood v. Allen, 130 S.
Ct. 841, 850 (2010) (finding that the decision not to pursue or present possible
mitigating evidence does not qualify as ineffective counsel if the record shows that
the decision was deliberate and strategic).
93. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003).
94. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989) (emphasis added).
95. See Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 770 (2008)
(addressing the frequent failure of defense counsel to investigate and present
mitigation evidence by suggesting that capital defendants retain the assistance of a
mitigation specialist).
96. Id. at 768; see, e.g., Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003)
(faulting counsel for the minimal investigation into the petitioner’s mental health
and social history); Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999)
(criticizing defense counsel’s performance at trial in failing to present any mitigating
evidence of defendant’s past and therefore calling into doubt the jury’s decision to
sentence the defendant to death).
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developing mitigation evidence, but they simply “did not know how
97
to do it properly.”
The ABA Guidelines provided attorneys a template for building
their client’s mitigation case. First, capital attorneys were required to
98
expand and restructure their defense teams. Defense teams were
now obligated to consist of at least two attorneys, an investigator, and
a mitigation specialist, with one team member qualified to identify
99
mental or psychological disorders. This was no small change; many
capital cases at the time were tried with a single defense attorney and
an investigator. Second, mitigation investigations were required to be
100
conducted regardless of the defendant’s cooperation.
Finally, the
ABA Guidelines recognized that developing mitigation evidence
“require[d] extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into
personal and family history,” which included inquiry into the
defendant’s medical, family, social, educational, military,
employment, and correctional history from “the moment of
101
conception.” While the Supreme Court had generally outlined the
necessary scope of social history investigations, the ABA Guidelines
“codified” the specific areas in which a capital defense team, and
102
particularly a mitigation specialist, must investigate.
The ABA
Guidelines represented a significant advancement in the attempt to
achieve individualized and constitutionally valid capital sentencing,
thereby becoming the national standard as courts adopted and
103
enforced their provisions.
In 2008, the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (“Supplementary Guidelines”) were
104
issued to further develop the mitigation function in capital cases.
The Supplementary Guidelines not only confirmed the indispensable
97. Maher, supra note 95, at 769.
98. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES guideline 4.1.
99. Id.
100. Id. guideline 10.7.
101. Id. guideline 10.7 cmt.
102. Id. guideline 4.1.
103. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 246–47 (referring to the
revised ABA Guidelines as “national standards of practice” that “have guided
numerous courts in rejecting proffered excuses for failing to investigate mitigation”);
see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (calling the 1989 ABA Guidelines
“well-defined norms”).
104. Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines].
Although the Supplementary Guidelines were developed in cooperation with the ABA’s
Death Penalty Representation Project, they were not an official publication of the
ABA. For a an account of how the Supplementary Guidelines came into being, see
O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 694–702.
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role of the mitigation specialist on the capital defense team, they also
105
identified and institutionalized those specialists’ best practices. For
example, the Supplementary Guidelines provided a more detailed list of
the areas of mitigation a specialist was required to investigate:
Mitigation evidence includes, but is not limited to, compassionate
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind, the
ability to make a positive adjustment to incarceration, the realities
of incarceration and the actual meaning of a life sentence, capacity
for redemption, remorse, execution impact, vulnerabilities related
to mental health, explanations of patterns of behavior, negation of
aggravating evidence regardless of its designation as an aggravating
factor, positive acts or qualities, responsible conduct in other areas
of life (e.g. employment, education, military service, as a family
member), any evidence bearing on the degree of moral culpability,
106
and any other reason for a sentence less than death.

The Supplementary Guidelines also outlined the necessary skills a
mitigation specialist must possess. Specialists could come from any
background, so long as they were “skilled interviewers who [could]
recognize and elicit information about mental health signs and
symptoms,” had the ability to “establish rapport with witnesses, the
client, the client’s family and significant others,” and were able to
“advise counsel on appropriate mental health and other expert
107
assistance.”
In addition, the Supplementary Guidelines required that
the defense team’s mitigation specialist conduct an exhaustive and
detailed investigation into the defendant’s life history, delving into
every possible influence that may have impacted the defendant since
108
birth.
Finally, the Supplementary Guidelines explained that a mitigation
investigation must include multiple “in-person, face-to-face, one-onone interviews” by the mitigation specialist, which should be
supported with both documentary evidence (e.g., genealogies, social
history reports, chronologies) and expert and lay testimony from a
109
variety of witnesses.
Taken together, these directives confirmed

105. Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 679.
106. Id. at 679.
107. Id. at 682; see also Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 248–50
(recounting how mitigation investigation requires a distinct skill-set typically
unlearned in the legal profession).
108. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 682 (life history can range
from a defendant’s medical, mental health, or substance abuse history, to evidence
of past trauma, educational problems, military experience, and community
influences).
109. See id. at 689–92 (“It is the duty of the defense team to aid counsel in
coordinating and integrating the case for life with the guilt or iunocence [sic] phase
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that the mitigation function is of “utmost importance in the defense
of capital cases,” and that the mitigation specialist —with all the
expertise that person brings to a case —is essential to the effective
110
representation of capital defendants.
Capital mitigation is no longer a mystery—at least to those paying
attention. What started as a vague mention in a single death penalty
111
case
has developed into a series of specific, institutionalized
mandates that require an exceptionally high standard of legal
112
representation. These mandates, developed and perfected over the
last thirty-plus years, compel a broad investigation into every aspect of
a capital defendant’s background and social history —and not just by
a single lawyer, but by a team of experts knowledgeable in the legal
complexities of the guilt and penalty phases of capital trials, who are
also able to construct a detailed social history of the defendant from a
113
variety of sources.
When the mitigation function operates as intended, it works. “Life
verdicts in cases involving horrendous loss of life,” as well as “[m]ore
mundane examples occur[ring] week after week in courtrooms
across the country,” demonstrate that death sentences are “never
114
automatic or inevitable.”
That is true because when skilled and
motivated capital defense teams use proven mitigation strategies, the
evidence they develop and present has a remarkable “transformative”
115
power to impact a defendant’s sentence.
This power is what
rendered the Unabomber’s seemingly hopeless death penalty case
into one in which Ted Kaczynski will serve a life sentence. The
question remains, however, whether that power may be successfully
strategy . . . . Multiple interviews will be necessary to establish trust, elicit sensitive
information and conduct a thorough and reliable life-history investigation.”).
110. Id. at 677.
111. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(requiring the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the crime and the
characteristics of the alleged criminal before recommending a sentence).
112. See supra notes 53–110 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 238 (listing high-profile death
penalty defendants, such as Lee Boyd Malvo, Zacarias Moussaoui, and Terry Nichols,
who all received life sentences, as well as Jeremy Gross, who was given a life sentence
despite that the murder he committed in a liquor store was recorded in its entirety).
115. Id.; see also Sarah Elizabeth Richards, How to Humanize a Killer, SALON (June 7,
2006,
9:00
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2006/06/07/mitigation_specialists
(validating the effectiveness of presenting mitigation evidence in court). Of course,
not all capital defendants have access to dedicated and skilled attorneys. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Hobbs, 131 S. Ct. 558 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (criticizing a capital defense attorney who called only one witness at the
penalty phase who did not personally know the defendant, and then failed to
introduce evidence of the defendant’s negligent upbringing, which involved extreme
sexual and physical abuse).
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harnessed outside the death penalty context. While mitigation may
no longer be a mystery, can defendants like Madoff use it effectively
in federal white collar cases?
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING
JURISPRUDENCE
The answer to that question is yes. But to fully understand how the
development of mitigation strategies for death penalty defendants
could benefit white collar defendants, it is necessary to review the
current state of federal white collar sentencing. As will be seen, the
evolution of white collar sentencing follows a parallel arc with the
development of capital mitigation. Recent changes in federal
sentencing law, similar to those occurring in the capital context a
generation prior, have completely remade the white collar sentencing
landscape. These changes, particularly the increase in judicial
sentencing discretion post-Booker, provide white collar counsel new
opportunities to use the tools of capital mitigation to more effectively
advocate for their clients at sentencing.
A. The Changing Role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Much like with Furman in the death penalty context, the current
state of federal white collar sentencing was created by an
“earthquake” Supreme Court decision, the effects of which are still
116
felt today. In the two decades leading up to 2005, federal sentences
were determined almost exclusively by the United States Sentencing
117
Guidelines (“Guidelines”).
Promulgated under the authority of
118
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Guidelines had the goal of
creating honesty in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentencing
disparities prevalent in the indeterminate, parole-based scheme
119
operating at the time. The Guidelines replaced the indeterminate
116. Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern
Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 670 (2005).
117. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 380–82
(2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Curious History] (providing an overview of the
Guidelines and an explanation of how they operate to calculate a defendant’s
sentence).
118. Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (2010)
(identifying Congress’s three objectives in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act); see
also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20
(2003) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was intended to eliminate
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system with one in which judicial sentencing discretion was
significantly reduced by establishing narrow sentencing ranges based
on a series of factors, including the type of offense, characteristics of
120
the victim and offender, and the defendant’s criminal history.
From their inception, the Guidelines were a lightning rod for
criticism. One of the primary arguments against the Guidelines was
121
that they were too rigid.
Part of that rigidity came from the
Guidelines’ sharp limitations of the arguments available to
122
defendants at sentencing. Dozens of Guidelines provisions directed
judges to consider a range of aggravating factors, but at the same
time directed them to disregard many mitigating factors, including
education level, family history, socioeconomic status, and drug
123
addiction.
While departures outside the calculated sentencing
range were contemplated, they were only allowed when the
circumstances of a case were not adequately taken into consideration
by the Guidelines, i.e., when the case was outside the “heartland” of
124
typical cases.
Departures were rarely granted, and when they did
125
begin to increase Congress attempted to limit their use.
126
Another criticism of the Guidelines was that they were too harsh.
Particularly as to white collar offenders, the Guidelines operated as a
unwarranted sentencing disparity . . . .”). See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING 38–77 (1998) (offering a comprehensive history of federal
sentencing).
120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1; see also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1988) (providing an overview of how the Guidelines work and the
basic principles underlying their implementation).
121. See J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth
Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 723–28 (2011)
[hereinafter Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles] (highlighting the friction between
Congress and federal judges forced to adhere to the Guidelines).
122. See id. at 726 (“The rigidity of the Guidelines can be traced to a zeal for
parity. . . . the Guidelines imposed dramatic limits on judicial discretion. Yet in
doing so, the Guidelines deprived judges of the ability to tailor appropriate sentences
to the characteristics of each offender and each offense.” (footnotes omitted)).
123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 1.4–1.6, 1.10–1.12
(identifying specific offender characteristics not ordinarily relevant in sentencing);
see also Breyer, supra note 120, at 19–20 (explaining that compromises by the
Sentencing Commission resulted in leaving out mitigating personal characteristics of
the defendant in favor of using criminal history to increase sentences).
124. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(4).
125. See Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles, supra note 121, at 712–13, 724 (“At
one point, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay threatened, ‘The judges need to be
intimidated . . . [t]hey need to uphold the Constitution. If they don’t behave, we’re
going to go after them in a big way.’ And in what sometimes seemed like a battle
between branches of government, some legislators threatened to strip judges of all
discretion, enacting broad slates of mandatory minimums.” (footnotes omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See id. at 707–11 (evaluating the arguments opposing the Guidelines’
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one-way “upward ratchet,” continually driving sentencing ranges
127
Indeed, one of the compromises embodied in the
higher.
Guidelines concerned increased penalties for white collar
128
defendants.
While the sentencing ranges for most crimes were
determined first by analyzing pre-Guidelines sentences and then by
establishing sentencing ranges based on past practices, the
sentencing ranges for economic crimes were set higher than in the
129
past based on policy decisions.
The Sentencing Commission
believed that white collar offenders deserved higher penalties
because they were receiving less severe treatment than other similar
130
offenders.
In addition, between 1987 and 2001, sentencing ranges climbed
from those initial elevated levels as the “loss table,” the main
determiner of offense level for white collar crimes, was repeatedly
131
adjusted upward.
A series of aggravating specific offense
characteristics was also added, which increased sentencing ranges

severity).
127. See James E. Felman, The Need To Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
High-Loss Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 138 (2010) (arguing that the
Guidelines caused unnecessarily long sentences for white-collar defendants who
typically lacked previous criminal records).
128. Breyer, supra note 120, at 20–21; Alan Ellis et al., At a “Loss” for Justice: Federal
Sentencing for Economic Offenses, 25 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (2011) [hereinafter Ellis et al.,
Loss for Justice].
129. See Bowman, Curious History, supra note 117, at 385 (detailing how the
Sentencing Commission purposefully increased sentences for crimes against
property over pre-Guidelines levels because the Commissioners “were plainly
concerned that probationary sentences had been too common in economic crimes”
and thus longer prison terms for white-collar offenders better served the Guidelines’
objectives); Felman, supra note 127, at 138 (“Unlike the penalties for most offenses,
which the initial Sentencing Commission pegged to match pre-Guidelines practice,
the commission specifically elected to increase the penalties for economic crimes in
the initial 1987 Guidelines over the pre-Guidelines as a whole.”). But see John R.
Steer, The Sentencing Commission’s Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT’G REP.
263, 263 (2003) (suggesting both a policy and empirical basis for the initial fraud
guidelines).
130. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 5 (2010) (noting
that economic crimes were being treated more leniently than other equivalent
behavior); Breyer, supra note 120, at 20 (“The Commission found in its data
significant discrepancies between pre-Guideline punishment of certain white-collar
crimes, such as fraud, and other similar common law crimes, such as theft.”).
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1); see also Bowman, Curious
History, supra note 117, at 387–91 (offering a comprehensive history of the evolution
and reform of the Guidelines); Ellis et al., Loss for Justice, supra note 128, at 36
(evaluating the Commission’s continuous adjustments to the loss table). The loss
table increases offense level, which is one of two factors that determines the
sentencing range (the other is criminal history), as the loss to the victim increases.
The current table has fifteen, two-level increases, up to thirty offense levels for a loss
of more than $400,000,000. Each increase of six offense levels approximately
doubles the sentence. Felman, supra note 127, at 138.
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132

even more. This trend continued into the early 2000s as Congress,
through its Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, directed heightened penalties
for economic crimes in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco
133
corporate scandals.
The result was a sentencing framework for
white collar offenders that limited probation, increased average
sentences, and exposed high-loss defendants to decades—and even a
134
lifetime —of imprisonment.
Then, in 2004, the entire landscape shifted. In Blakely v.
135
Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth
Amendment permitted a Washington sentencing judge to increase a
defendant’s sentence above a prescribed sentencing range based on
an aggravating factor found by the judge but not admitted by the
136
defendant nor proved to a jury. The State of Washington charged
defendant Ralph Blakely with first-degree kidnapping and domestic
violence after he threatened his wife and thirteen-year-old son with a
137
shotgun.
Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnapping, a
lesser offense that subjected him to a maximum of fifty-three months’
imprisonment under Washington’s determinate guideline sentencing
138
scheme. However, upon hearing the sordid details of the crime at
132. See Bowman, Curious History, supra note 117, at 387 (noting that in the years
following the 1989 updates to the Guidelines, the Commission “added an array of
specific offense characteristics and passed numerous amendments”).
133. Compare id. at 431–35 (characterizing the Congressional motives of the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation), with Frank O. Bowman, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate
Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 168–69 (2008) [hereinafter
Bowman, Sentencing] (indicating how the Guidelines resulted in CEO’s receiving
lengthy prison sentences in white collar cases).
134. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 168 (charting increases in a
hypothetical corporate defendant’s sentence from 1987 to 2007). Most recently,
Congress has asked the Sentencing Commission to evaluate whether penalties for
securities and mortgage fraud should be increased in response to the global financial
collapse of 2008. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1079A, 124 Stat. 2077 (2010) (directing the Sentencing
Commission to “review and, if appropriate, amend the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of offenses relating
to securities fraud or any other similar provision of law, in order to reflect the intent
of Congress that penalties for the offenses under the guidelines and policy
statements appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to the public and
the financial markets from the offenses”). The Act contains a similarly worded
provision related to financial institution and mortgage fraud, requiring the
Commission to “ensure appropriate terms of imprisonment for offenders involved in
substantial bank frauds or other frauds relating to financial institutions.” While the
explicit text of the Act does not require the Commission to promulgate guidelines
increasing penalties, it is unlikely that Congress intended for the Commission to
lower sentences for white collar offenders after the largest financial collapse in U.S.
history. See id.
135. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
136. Id. at 298.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 298–99. For an overview of how various sentencing schemes, including

HAUGH.TO_AUTHOR3 (DO NOT DELETE)

24

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/10/2012 2:15 PM

[Vol. 62:1

sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Blakely had been “deliberately cruel[]” and imposed a ninety-month
139
This “exceptional” sentence was thirty-seven months
sentence.
higher than the “standard maximum” under the guidelines, but was
140
still within the statutory maximum for second-degree kidnapping.
Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-4 majority, found this increase
beyond the presumptive guideline range unconstitutional because it
141
deprived Blakely of his Sixth Amendment jury trial rights.
The
Blakely Court, extending the reach of its decision in Apprendi v. New
142
Jersey, held that any fact other than a prior conviction that raises the
penalty “beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
143
The
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Court defined “statutory maximum” not as the overall statutory
maximum based on the type of offense, but as the “maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
144
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” In other words, “the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings” beyond what the jury found
145
in its verdict or what was admitted by the defendant.
Despite the obvious implications for the federal sentencing
scheme, which was strikingly similar to Washington’s scheme, the

determinant schemes, may meet the goals of sentencing, see generally CASSIA C.
SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? (2d ed. 2009).
139. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 305. The Court in Blakely relied on a different aspect of the Sixth
Amendment than it had in the Williams line of capital cases. Compare Blakely, 542 U.S.
at 300 (relying on the right to trial by jury), with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399
(2000) (relying on the right to effective counsel).
142. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi is considered a “watershed” decision.
[It] declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime enhancement that
enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than the otherwise
available statutory maximum for various crimes based on a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that an offense involved racial animus. The
Apprendi Court asserted the hate crime sentencing enhancement was
constitutionally problematic because, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Berman, supra note 116, at 672 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
143. Id. at 490; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (supporting Apprendi’s “bright-line
rule” based on the constitutional right to a jury-trial); Berman, supra note 116, at
672–73 (describing Apprendi as a “watershed” decision due to its categorization of
judicial fact-finding as “constitutionally problematic”).
144. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
145. Id. at 303–04.
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majority did not address Blakely’s application to the Guidelines. In
separate dissents, however, four Justices warned that the majority’s
opinion would mean an end to all determinate guidelines systems,
hindering sentencing reforms aimed at increasing fairness and
147
decreasing disparity.
Observers believed Blakely meant the end of
what had been known as the “sentencing revolution” —the move
from indeterminate sentencing culminating in the passage of the
148
Sentencing Reform Act and the implementation of the Guidelines.
The observers were half right. A year later, in United States v.
149
Booker,
the Court squarely addressed whether the Federal
150
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. In another
5-4 decision, the Court, as predicted, found “no distinction of
constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing
151
Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in [Blakely].”
The Court reiterated that other than the fact of prior conviction, any
fact necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established in a guilty plea or by jury verdict
152
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the
Guidelines were mandatory, thereby requiring judges to increase a
defendant’s “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes” based on
factual findings not submitted to a jury, they violated the Sixth
153
Amendment.
The obvious remedy was to invalidate the Guidelines entirely, as
the Court had done in Blakely; however, the Court took another path.

146. See id. at 305 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express
no opinion on them.”).
147. See id. at 323 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The consequences of today’s
decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing. Washington’s sentencing
system is by no means unique. Numerous other States have enacted guidelines
systems, as has the Federal Government. Today’s decision casts constitutional doubt
over them all . . . .” (citations omitted)).
148. Berman, supra note 116, at 654–59.
149. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
150. Id. at 226–27.
151. Id. at 233.
152. See id. at 230–32 (describing protection against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as a basic precept that “provide[s] the basis for . . .
interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing procedures”).
153. Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court rejected the
argument that the availability of a sentencing departure in specific circumstances
avoided the constitutional issue, stating that:
[I]n most cases, as a matter of law, the [Sentencing] Commission will have
adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departures will be
legally permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines . . . . It was for this reason we rejected a
similar argument in Blakely.
Id. at 234.
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In what was essentially a separate opinion, a different majority of
Justices determined that the constitutional remedy was to excise two
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, thereby rendering the
154
Guidelines advisory.
The Court determined this option was
155
consistent with both legislative intent and the Sixth Amendment.
According to the Court, sentencing judges would still be required to
consider the Guidelines when making sentencing decisions, but they
also would be permitted to tailor sentences in light of other statutory
156
factors.
Because the now-advisory Guidelines did not create
“statutory maximums” under Apprendi and Blakely, no Sixth
157
Amendment concerns were implicated. Thus, the Court remedied
the constitutional infirmities of the Guidelines without completely
destroying the federal sentencing scheme that had been in place for
the past twenty years.
As clever as the Booker opinion might have been in avoiding a
wholesale invalidation of the Guidelines, it was not exactly a bastion
of clarity. Professor Douglas Berman has commented:
The Booker decision, remarkable for many reasons, found a way to
make a conceptually muddled constitutional jurisprudence
concerning sentencing procedures even more opaque . . . .
Through the dual rulings of dueling majorities, the Supreme Court
in Booker declared that the federal sentencing system could no
longer rely upon mandated and tightly directed judicial factfinding, and as a remedy it created a system which now depends
upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding. Thus,
to culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking to vindicate the
role of the jury and to require a new set of sentencing procedures
in modern sentencing systems, the so-called “remedial majority” in
Booker devised a new system of federal sentencing which granted
judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously
wielded and seemingly endorsed the entire panoply of relatively lax
sentencing procedures that had been used in the federal system
158
over the prior two decades.

Just as Lockett had done previously, Booker transformed the legal
154. See id. at 245 (excising § 3553(b)(1), which required sentencing courts to
impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range, and § 3742(e), which set
forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the
applicable guidelines range).
155. See id. at 246–49 (concluding that Congress would likely have preferred the
excision of two provisions to the invalidation of the Sentencing Reform Act in its
entirety).
156. Id. at 245–46.
157. See id. at 259 (“With [the] two sections excised . . . the remainder of the Act
satisfies the Court’s constitutional requirements.”).
158. Berman, supra note 116, at 676.
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landscape, but it failed to give clear direction to sentencing judges
and those practicing sentencing advocacy. It was certain that judges
now had considerably more discretion to conduct individualized
sentencing; less certain was how that discretion would be exercised in
practice. Could judges essentially ignore the Guidelines and base
sentences on any mitigating or aggravating factor? How would
attorneys react to Booker’s new grant of judicial discretion—would
they continue to act as if the Guidelines were still binding and do
nothing, or would they, as some in the capital realm had done, look
at sentencing creatively and become more effective advocates? And
what would be the nuances of post-Booker appellate review of
sentences in and outside of the Guidelines?
Since Booker, the Court has continued to address the operation of
the now-advisory, federal sentencing system in an attempt to answer
159
these questions. In Rita v. United States, the Court held that courts
of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness standard when
reviewing a sentence imposed within a properly-calculated Guidelines
160
range.
The Court emphasized the close relationship between the
Guidelines and the sentencing objectives stated in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), the broad statutory sentencing factors underlying the
161
Sentencing Reform Act.
The Court stated that a reasonableness
presumption reflects the “double determination” of the § 3553(a)
factors and the Guidelines, which require “the same conclusion as to
162
the proper sentence in [a] particular case.”
According to the
Court, an appellate court could presume a sentence within the
Guidelines was reasonable because the Guidelines “reflect a rough
approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s
163
objectives.”
164
In Gall v. United States, the Court addressed the flipside of Rita,
holding that a presumption of unreasonableness did not apply to a

159. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
160. Id. at 347.
161. Id. at 345; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (providing that “[t]he Court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the
specific purposes codified in the statute).
162. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
163. Id. at 350. The Court has further clarified that the presumption of
reasonableness does not apply at the district court level; the presumption is only
applicable on appeal. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per
curiam) (“The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are
also not to be presumed reasonable.”).
164. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
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165

sentence outside the Guidelines.
The Court rejected the
proportionality calculus used by some circuit courts in reviewing
sentences because such a calculus came “too close to creating an
impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences
166
167
outside the Guidelines range.”
In Kimbrough v. United States,
decided the same day as Gall, the Court continued to refine the
bounds of judicial sentencing discretion by holding that a judge
could reasonably grant a downward variance from the sentencing
168
range based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines.
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough also clarified important procedural issues
left open by Booker. The Court explained that when sentencing a
defendant, a district judge must follow a three-step process. First, the
169
judge must calculate the applicable Guidelines range.
Then, the
judge must determine whether to depart from the sentencing range
in situations falling outside the “heartland” of cases to which the
170
Guidelines were intended to apply.
Third, after the sentencing
range is calculated, the judge must “then consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence
171
requested.” A judge is free to provide a “variance” if he decides an
172
Appellate courts
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted.
reviewing sentences must also follow a prescribed structure: first
determining whether the sentencing court committed a procedural
error by miscalculating the Guidelines, then determining whether
the sentence was substantively reasonable under an abuse of
173
discretion standard.
With its Kimbrough decision, the Court had gone far in clarifying
the procedural and substantive boundaries of the advisory guidelines

165. See id. at 41 (“[C]ourts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside,
just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”).
166. Id. at 47.
167. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
168. See id. at 111 (determining that in light of the inconsistencies and particular
circumstances of the case, a reviewing court could not rationally find the sentence
reduction to be an abuse of discretion). In Kimbrough, the Court upheld the district
court’s below-Guidelines sentence based on the judge’s disagreement with the
hundred-to-one ratio for crack versus powder cocaine sentences. See id. at 91.
169. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (explaining that “the Guidelines should be the
starting point and the initial benchmark” at sentencing); Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (finding that a judge will usually consider the presentence
report first and how it affects the guidelines).
170. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351.
171. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
172. Id. at 50.
173. Id. at 51.
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175

system.
But not until Pepper v. United States did the Court
unequivocally establish the breadth of a district court’s “wide
discretion” at sentencing. The decision allowed courts to consider
the “fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
176
characteristics”
and brought federal sentencing much in line with
the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence developed twenty years
prior.
In Pepper, the Court was asked to determine whether a district court
could consider evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing
177
rehabilitation at resentencing.
Based on a large downward
departure under the Guidelines, Jason Pepper was originally
sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to
178
distribute methamphetamine.
The government appealed, arguing
179
After a Booker remand, the district
the departure was too great.
court resentenced Pepper to the original sentence, this time based
partly on his post-sentencing rehabilitation, which included
successful drug treatment, a straight-A performance as a full-time
180
college student, steady employment, and strong family support.
Following a second government appeal, the Eighth Circuit
determined that “‘evidence of [defendant]’s post-sentencing
rehabilitation is not relevant and will not be permitted at
181
resentencing,’” and the case was once again remanded.
Without
the benefit of his post-sentencing rehabilitation arguments, Pepper
182
Pepper
was resentenced to sixty-five months imprisonment.

174. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007). Between Rita, Gall, and
Kimbrough, the Court had sanctioned the sentencing court’s consideration of a
number of mitigating factors: withdrawal from a criminal drug conspiracy,
possessing a college degree and starting a successful business, support of family and
friends, age at time of the offense, lack of criminal history, military experience,
vulnerability in prison, physical condition, and the unjust effect of a particular
provision in the Guidelines. Id.; Gall, 552 U.S. at 43–44; Rita, 551 U.S. at 344–45.
175. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
176. Id. at 1233 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 46–47 (1949)).
177. Id. at 1235–36.
178. Id. at 1236.
179. United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2005).
180. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236.
181. United States v. Pepper, 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Jenners, 473 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 2007)), vacated, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008). A
policy statement in the Guidelines against considering post-sentencing rehabilitation,
§ 5K2.19 (“Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts”), formed the basis of the Eighth
Circuit’s decision. Compare Pepper, 486 F.3d at 413, with § 5K2.19 cmt. (“[P]ostsentencing rehabilitative measures should not provide a basis for downward
departure when resentencing a defendant initially sentenced to a term of
imprisonment . . . .”).
182. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1238. Because he had already served his original twentyfour-month sentence, Pepper would have had to surrender to the Bureau of Prisons
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appealed again, and this time the Eighth Circuit sustained the
183
sentence.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor reversed the Eighth
184
Circuit’s decision.
The Court’s opinion began by echoing the
language of its capital cases: “It has been uniform and constant in
the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes
185
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” The Court went
on to state, again quoting from capital cases, that it was “essential”
that the district court “consider the widest possible breadth of
information about the defendant” to ensure that the sentence “will
186
suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.”
The Court found that the language of the Sentencing Reform Act
surviving after Booker did not constrain judicial sentencing discretion;
indeed, it “preserved the traditional discretion of sentencing courts
to ‘conduct an inquiry broad in scope [and] largely unlimited’” in
187
“In determining
the kind of information that may be considered.
the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a
departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider,
without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited
188
by law.”
The Court therefore held that a district court may
consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation at resentencing
and grant a downward variance when appropriate as part of the
189
court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
Because this
for an additional forty-one months, likely losing his job and apartment in the
process.
183. Id. Pepper had an intervening trip up to the Eighth Circuit and back down for
resentencing; all told, the case was before the Eighth Circuit four times and the
Supreme Court twice. See United States v. Pepper, 570 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 1229; United States v. Pepper, 518 F.3d 949 (8th Cir.
2008); Pepper, 486 F.3d 408; Pepper, 412 F.3d 995.
184. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1250 (rejecting “the Court of Appeals’ erroneous views
regarding post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence”).
185. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
Compare id. at 1240 (highlighting that the punishment should fit the individual
offender, including not only the facts of the crime at issue but also the defendant’s
character), with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (discussing the
“diverse frailties of humankind” that must be explored in death penalty cases while
considering both the “offender and the offense”).
186. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
187. Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).
188. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3661 (2006))).
189. Id. at 1241.
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conclusion conflicted with a statutory provision that precluded a
court on resentencing from imposing a sentence outside “the
Guidelines range except upon a ‘ground of departure’ that was
expressly relied upon in the prior sentencing,” the Court invalidated
190
the provision as inconsistent with Booker.
B. The Current State of White Collar Sentencing
Much has been written about the Booker line of cases and their
impact on federal sentencing. Suffice it to say, the Booker decision
was a bombshell, a massive “aftershock” of Blakely that continues to
191
“surprise and confound” judges, practitioners, and academics. Just
a few years ago, few observers would have expected the sentencing
landscape to look as it does today. In less than a decade, a
determinate sentencing guidelines system that “mandated and tightly
192
directed judicial fact-finding”
was transformed into one that
depends upon discretion and allows judges to consider “without
193
limitation” a defendant’s “background, character, and conduct.”
With the Pepper decision, the Court’s federal sentencing
jurisprudence appears to be traveling a similar arc to that of its
capital jurisprudence, in which individualized determinations by a
sentencer possessed of wide discretion are paramount in the
sentencing process. But the question remains: What does this mean
for federal defendants, particularly white collar defendants such as
Bernie Madoff, who are facing the upward ratchet of higher
sentences?
Booker and its progeny have had a number of significant practical
effects in white collar cases. First, and most fundamentally, courts
194
now have almost unrestrained discretion to impose a sentence.
There is no more forced rigidity in sentencing. Booker eliminated the
required adherence to the Guidelines, replacing it with discretion
190. See id. at 1244 (explaining that Booker rendered the Guidelines “effectively
advisory by invalidating . . . [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), which prescribed the standard of
appellate review, including de novo review of Guidelines departures”).
191. Berman, supra note 116, at 670, 675. “The potential impact of Blakely on
modern sentencing systems is truly staggering because the decision not only
redefined the reach of Apprendi, but also suggests that any and every fact legally
essential to the punishment must be either proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 676.
193. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1252 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
1B1.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661)).
194. See Berman, supra note 116, at 676 (describing the emergence of “a system
which now depends upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding”
and “grant[s] judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously
wielded”).
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bounded by the broad statutory sentencing factors underlying the
195
Sentencing Reform Act. The § 3553(a) factors had always governed
196
but because the Guidelines were mandatory and
sentencing,
provided much more specific guidance during a sentencing
197
calculation, courts and litigators paid the sentencing statute little
198
attention. Now, with the Guidelines just one factor among many, §
199
3553(a) is the driving force at sentencing.
And as Pepper made
clear, Congress, through its statutory language, “expressly preserved”
the traditional discretion of sentencing courts to consider “largely
200
unlimited” information regarding the defendant’s conduct.
The
standard of appellate review as clarified by Rita and Gall also
strengthens district courts’ discretion. A court that follows the
correct procedure —first determining the Guidelines range, and then
sentencing pursuant to § 3553(a) — will have a sentence overturned
201
It should be obvious then why Judge
only if it is unreasonable.
Denny Chin felt free to sentence Madoff to a largely “symbolic”
sentence that was 100 years more than recommended by the
202
probation department—he knew he could.
195. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (establishing the “kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range” for the “applicable category of offense committed . . . [or] in the
case of violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a).
197. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1.
198. Although somewhat anecdotal, a review of a sample of defense sentencing
submissions and sentencing opinions prior to Booker reveals little or no mention of §
3553(a) factors; if the section is referenced, it is in passing. The focus is always on
application and operation of the Guidelines. This is consistent with the author’s
experience defending federal white collar clients prior to Booker.
199. See AMY BARON-EVANS, NAT’L FED. DEFENDER SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL, RITA,
GALL AND KIMBROUGH: A CHANCE FOR REAL SENTENCING IMPROVEMENTS 4 (2008),
available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/rita-gall-kimbroughsentencing-strategies-5-11-08.pdf (“Section 3553(a)(1) requires the sentencing court
to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant in every case, and the statute trumps any guideline
or policy statement to the contrary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011).
201. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“Assuming that the district
court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.”).
202. Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 4, 49. Madoff chose not to appeal his
sentence given the obvious futility. Even if he had, however, it is extremely unlikely
the Second Circuit would have found the sentence procedurally defective or
substantively unreasonable. See Allan Chernoff, Madoff Won’t Appeal 150-year Sentence,
Attorney Says, CNN.COM (July 9, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-0709/justice/madoff.appeal_1_bernard-madoff-madoff-attorney-district-judge-dennychin? (labeling Madoff’s sentence as “symbolic” of the severity of his crime, despite
the insistence of his attorney that “people are not symbols” and “are sentenced
under a reasonable standard”).
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Second, flowing from the increase in judicial discretion afforded by
Booker, advocates may now make a wide variety of arguments at
sentencing. Booker, like Lockett in the death penalty context, opened
the door to a variety of new mitigating arguments previously
203
unavailable to defense counsel.
And Pepper, like Williams, signaled
to advocates just how important the development of mitigating
204
evidence could be to support those arguments.
Advocates are no
longer constrained by the Guidelines commentary or policy
205
statements. Instead, a defendant may argue “without limitation” any
mitigating evidence concerning the background, character, or
conduct of the defendant in order to achieve a sentence within the
Guidelines range, a Guideline-sanctioned departure, or a “variance”
206
outside the Guidelines pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors.
Indeed, the § 3553(a) factors offer an incredibly broad range of
possible mitigating arguments at sentencing. Section 3553(a) begins
with an overarching mandate: “[C]ourt[s] shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
207
The statute goes on to direct courts to
purposes [of the statue].”

203. Of course, prosecutors are also allowed to argue more freely at sentencing.
However, they are generally less likely to argue for variances from the Guidelines
based on something other than substantial assistance or safety valve relief. Moreover,
the government has always been a staunch supporter of determinate sentencing and
curtailing judicial discretion as a way to reduce sentencing disparity. See Letter from
Lanny A. Breuer to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Sept. 2,
2011), reprinted in 24 FED SENT’G REP. 137 (2011) (setting out the Department of
Justice’s goals for federal sentencing policy, which include “eliminat[ing]
unwarranted sentencing disparities”); Letter from Jonathan J. Wrobleski, Dir. of
Office of Policy and Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions,
Chair, U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, (June 28, 2010), reprinted in 23 FED SENT’G REP. 282
(2011) (lamenting a “significant set of criminal cases . . . sentenced by judges who
regularly impose sentences outside the applicable guidelines range irrespective of
offense type or nature of the offender”).
204. See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (emphasizing the importance of mitigating
evidence and the underlying principle that “the punishment should fit the offender
and not merely the crime” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949))).
205. See id. at 1239, 1241 (explaining that, though a sentencing court must “give
respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker permits the court to tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well” (quoting Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007))).
206. Id. at 1240–41.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). This provision embodies the “parsimony
principle,” which has been described as requiring “a sentencing court when handing
down a sentence [to] be stingy enough to avoid one that is too long, but also that it
be generous enough to avoid one that is too short.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
1160, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
View from the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2002) (defining the “parsimony principle” as a
judge imposing “a sentence only long enough to achieve the purposes of sentencing,
but no longer”).
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consider almost anything related to the defendant or his potential
punishment:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the [Guidelines] sentencing
range . . .

...
(5) any pertinent
Guidelines] . . .

policy

statement

[contained

in

the

...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . . and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
208
offense.

In addition, a companion provision states that “[n]o limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose
209
of imposing an appropriate sentence.”
This expansive language
sounds strikingly similar to the Supplementary Guidelines’ directives to
mitigation specialists regarding the areas they must investigate during
210
a social history investigation. And just as in the capital context, the
208. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
209. Id. § 3661.
210. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006) (directing the Sentencing Commission to
consider a defendant’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional
condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment,
family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history,
and the degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood when creating
the Guidelines), with Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 679 (“Mitigation
evidence includes . . . compassionate factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind, . . . vulnerabilities related to mental health, explanations of patterns of
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“fundamental point” is that sentencing mitigation arguments have
211
essentially “no boundaries” under current federal law.
Increased judicial discretion and the broad ability of advocates to
argue the § 3553(a) factors lead to a third practical effect of Booker.
Sentences, particularly for white collar defendants, are becoming
increasingly separated from the sentencing ranges calculated under
the Guidelines. Prior to Booker, judges granted non-government212
sponsored below-Guidelines-range sentences in only 5.5% of cases.
213
In the year after Booker, that number jumped to 12.5%. Since then,
there has been a steady increase of below Guidelines range sentences,
214
215
rising to a peak of 17.8% in 2010, and now sitting at 17.4%. The
216
is even more pronounced.
Nontrend for fraud offenses
governmental sponsored, below-Guidelines range sentences in fraud
cases rose from 6.2% prior to Booker, to 16.4% after Booker, and now
217
sits at 22.6%.
This means that judges, following arguments raised
behavior, negation of aggravating evidence regardless . . . positive acts or qualities,
responsible conduct in other areas of life . . . .”). However, the Commission “seized
upon criminal history as highly relevant,” but concluded other factors were not. See
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1346 (2011).
211. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 240; see O’Brien, When Life
Depends on It, supra note 37, at 713 (noting that “the scope of mitigation evidence [is]
‘potentially infinite’” and “‘anything under the sun’ can be tendered by the defense
in mitigation of punishment” (footnotes omitted)). Of course, there are bounds to
what evidence an advocate may introduce at a sentencing hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(i)(2) (allowing parties to introduce evidence at a sentencing hearing, but
requiring witness testimony to comply with certain rules).
212. See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary H.R., 109th Cong. 20 (statement of J. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n) (discussing non-governmental sponsored below Guidelines
range sentences during the post-PROTECT Act period, i.e., the time after the
PROTECT Act was passed, which attempted to curtail departures and increase
appellate review of below Guidelines sentences, and before Booker). Government
sponsored below-Guidelines-range sentences include substantial assistance
departures (section 5K1.1) and safety valve departures (section 5K3.1), which are
incorporated into the Guidelines. Because government sponsored below-range
sentences are granted pursuant to the Guidelines, non-governmental sponsored
below range sentences are the best measure of whether the Guidelines are being
followed by sentencing courts.
213. See id. (discussing the changes in below-Guidelines sentencing after Booker).
214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.G [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/FigureG.pdf.
215. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS
tbl.N
[hereinafter
2011
SOURCEBOOK],
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/
TableN.pdf.
216. The Sentencing Commission does not consistently break out statistics for
white collar offenses; the fraud offense category includes white collar crimes, as well
as other forms of economic crimes sentenced under section 2B1.1. Id. tbl.27.
217. Id. tbl.27A. The numbers are even higher when focusing on offenders
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by counsel at sentencing, are increasingly willing to exercise their
discretion and sentence defendants, including white collar
defendants, outside the Guidelines.
While the statistics demonstrate that judges are more often being
persuaded to sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range, this
does not mean judicial discretion is always exercised in a white collar
defendant’s favor. Nor does it mean a defendant’s sentence will be
minimal even if the court grants a variance. In fact, many contend
the sentencing of white collar defendants, particularly those of high218
loss offenders such as Madoff, has retained all of its “harshness.”
Some say, more pointedly, that white collar sentencing, even under
219
the advisory Guidelines system, is completely “out of whack” and
220
“patently absurd on [its] face.”
Critics cite the steady increases in
the Guidelines ranges for economic crimes and public outrage over
high-profile corporate scandals as the reason white collar defendants
221
are being sentenced drastically higher than in the past.
As
Professor Frank Bowman points out, “[u]nder the current
Guidelines,” which are the starting point for determining a federal
sentence, “a judge who wanted to impose a twenty-five-year sentence
on an Ebbers, Skilling, or a Rigas, thus equating their economic
offenses with murder by a five-time felon, would have to depart
222
downward nineteen offense levels to do it.” Putting aside whether these
types of “marquee corporate convicts” are deserving of such lengthy
sentences, it can hardly be argued that white collar defendants have
significantly more exposure at sentencing than they did in years
223
past.

sentenced under the fraud guideline, section 2B1.1, which would include the vast
majority of white collar offenders. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, White Collar
Sentencing Data Fiscal Year 2005–Fiscal Year 2009, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 128 (2009)
[hereinafter White Collar Sentencing Data]. In fiscal year 2011, 22.9% of section 2B1.1
offenders received a non-government sponsored below range sentence. 2011
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, tbl.27A. The limited data available focusing specifically
on white collar offenders indicates that current non-government sponsored below
range sentences top twenty-five percent. White Collar Sentencing Data, supra.
218. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 172 (concluding that the
Guidelines sentences are drastically severe).
219. Id.
220. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
221. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169 (discussing the sentences of
high-profile white collar criminals); Felman, supra note 127, at 138 (explaining how
the Guidelines were increased in response to high-profile scandals).
222. Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169.
223. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756–63 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (cataloging the calculated Guidelines ranges and sentences of recent white
collar defendants).
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In short, federal white collar sentencing is in a schizophrenic state.
Despite the increased opportunities to argue for a below-Guidelines
sentence based on expanded judicial sentencing discretion postBooker, white collar defendants still routinely face harsh, and many
times extreme, penalties. If a white collar defendant commits a high
loss crime, he could face a sentence comparable to that of the most
reviled corporate offenders—the Skillings, Ebbers, and Madoffs of
the world—possibly resulting in a Guidelines sentence of life
224
imprisonment. Yet that same defendant might be able to persuade
the court to exercise its wide discretion and grant a downward
225
variance from the Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of a few years.
This level of risk and reward compels white collar counsel to employ
226
innovative strategies at sentencing to mitigate their clients’ conduct.
As one veteran white collar defense attorney has said, “after years in
227
the wilderness, sentencing advocacy . . . is back.”
III. APPLICATION OF CAPITAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES IN WHITE
COLLAR CASES
The above discussion should familiarize white collar counsel with
the concept of mitigation, its legal framework, and the opportunities
afforded by the parallel arc of federal sentencing jurisprudence. It

224. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 168 (demonstrating the increases
in potential sentences for corporate defendants convicted of high-loss frauds).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010)
(sentencing a defendant involved in an identity theft conspiracy with total loss of
more than $200 million to twenty-four months on a sentencing range calling for life
imprisonment). Concerns over inconsistencies in financial fraud sentences have also
been expressed by Lanny Breuer, head of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal
Division. See Joe Palazzolo, Proceedings: Highlights from the Law Blog, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
21, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000142405297020371070457705027282
2256642.html (quoting Breuer, “[a] defendant in one district may be sentenced to
one or two years in prison for causing hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, while
a defendant in another district is sentenced to ten or twenty years in prison for
causing much smaller losses”); see also, Reynolds Holding, Rajaratnam Sentence Shows
Value of Court Process, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:35 PM IST),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/10/13/idINIndia-59881220111013 (discussing
the unpredictability of white collar sentences and arguing a defendant’s “tough
defense” helped the sentencing judge “get it about right” when sentencing him to
eleven years).
226. See, e.g., Alan Ellis, Inside Baseball: Interview with Former Federal Probation Officer,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2007, at 36, 36 (suggesting the defense bar cannot “simply act
like ‘business as usual’” and urging the use of mitigation techniques in white collar
cases). Although Madoff’s sentencing is the highest-profile example, there is
evidence that the defense community as a whole has not altered its approach to
sentencing to fully take advantage of Booker and its progeny. See id. (urging all
defense attorneys to adopt mitigation strategies).
227. MARVIN PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIMES § 7:10 (2011), available at Westlaw
SECCRIM.
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should also convince white collar counsel of the critical
importance—and the “transformative” power— mitigation evidence
has at sentencing. But, as in the capital context, counsel still needs to
228
know “how to do it properly.” The following section provides “best
practices” mitigation strategies developed and perfected during the
modern capital sentencing era that can be employed in white collar
cases.
Before addressing the specific strategies, however, two caveats are
in order. First, mitigation strategies are applicable to all federal
sentencings, not just white collar sentencings. However, white collar
defendants are particularly well-suited to learn from and employ
mitigation techniques. White collar defendants, unlike many in the
federal criminal system, often have the resources to implement the
229
strategies. Employing a team of attorneys and mitigation specialists,
and allowing them to spend the necessary time developing mitigation
evidence (which requires hours of one-on-one interviews and
230
extensive document review), is out of reach for most defendants.
Additionally, as discussed, judges may be more willing to credit
mitigation evidence as it relates to white collar defendants,
particularly those in high loss situations, because the Guidelines
231
ranges are so “out of whack” as to be “of no help” at sentencing.
This provides an opening for white collar counsel to forcefully argue
232
for lesser sentences using mitigation strategies.
Second, although developing white collar mitigation evidence in
the manner of capital counsel is necessary in today’s sentencing
landscape, the goals of doing so are slightly different. In capital
cases, counsel is trying to obtain, rather than avoid, a life sentence for
their client. This is often accomplished by mitigating the defendant’s
conduct by focusing on his developmental years, which are often

228. Maher, supra note 95, at 769.
229. See Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, The Cost of Defense, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7,
2007, available at http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00136/_res/id=
Attachments/index=0/07008070012Morvillo.pdf (explaining that many white collar
defendants have a high net worth or are indemnified by their employer).
230. See id. (explaining that the costs of defending a typical white collar case may
run in the millions of dollars).
231. Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169, 172; see United States v. Watt, 707
F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing how the Guidelines provided little
guidance because they called for a life sentence, which was much higher than the
statutory maximum sentence of five years).
232. See Haney, supra note 26, at 848 (examining how attorneys took advantage of
advances in psychology). All defendants, however, will benefit from their counsel
understanding the current state of federal sentencing law and by viewing sentencing
advocacy more creatively, as those in the capital realm have done.
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233

defined by violence, abuse, and cognitive impairment. Mitigating a
white collar offender’s conduct is primarily focused on establishing
the client’s capacity for rehabilitation. Because many white collar
defendants have not faced the extreme upbringings as those of
capital defendants (or at least appear not to have), counsel often
focuses on demonstrating prior good works.
However, as will be discussed below, developing mitigation
evidence can advance both goals for both types of defendants. While
not every white collar defendant will share a social history with that of
an accused killer —not every Madoff is a Kaczynski —some might.
And even for those that do not, the process of uncovering and
developing mitigation evidence, whatever it may be, is as important as
the end result. The aim of individualized sentencing, a “uniform and
constant” federal judicial tradition, is predicated on the “unique
234
study” of each defendant to be sentenced.
Developing mitigation
evidence through the specific strategies outlined in this Article allows
white collar counsel to conduct that unique study in a thoughtful and
principled way.
A. Strategy 1—Change Your Mindset
The first thing counsel must do to effectively use mitigation
strategies in white collar cases is change their mindset. Most
experienced defense attorneys practicing today, as well as most
judges, cut their sentencing teeth during a time when the Guidelines
235
tightly controlled all aspects of a defendant’s sentence.
In fact,
prior to 2005, when Booker was decided, most attorneys had practiced
236
exclusively under a Guidelines regime. This type of familiarity with
a system creates a certain cognitive inertia that can be hard to
237
overcome.
Modern white collar sentencing advocacy demands

233. See, e.g., Rompillia v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 391–92 (2005).
234. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239–40 (2011).
235. See Ellis et al., Litigating, supra note 36, at 30 (explaining how attorneys
became used to the rigid pre-Booker guidelines).
236. See id. (discussing how attorneys who grew accustomed to the rigid guidelines
before Booker should adapt to the sentencing options now available).
237. See Ellis et al, Loss for Justice, supra note 128, at 38 (discussing the various
developments in sentencing for economic offenses). Cognitive inertia is the
“tendency or motive to move forward through the cognitive process in the direction
indicated.” Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141 (2004)
(“[I]ndividuals, depending on a variety of factors—such as their cognitive load,
motivations, and affect—will generally process the information as efficiently and
quickly as possible, choosing the cognitive path of least resistance.”). Professor
Nancy Gertner has argued that the phenomenon of cognitive “anchoring” also
impacts judges’ continued reliance on the Guidelines. See Nancy Gertner, From
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more, however. Counsel must start by taking to heart the words of
the Supreme Court in Pepper: “In determining the sentence to
impose . . . the court may consider, without limitation, any information
concerning the background, character and conduct of the
238
defendant[.]”
The Guidelines, and their rigid formulaic structure
that precluded consideration of most mitigating factors, no longer
exclusively control a defendant’s sentence.
First, the Guidelines are one factor among seven that must be
239
addressed at sentencing.
At least two of the other § 3553(a)
factors — “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the
sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner” —speak directly
240
to classic notions of mitigation. The four other factors, at the very
241
least, invite courts to consider mitigating arguments, as does the
parsimony principle overriding § 3553(a).
Accordingly, the
development and presentation of mitigation evidence should be
equally important to the court’s sentencing determination as a
Guidelines calculation.
In addition, even when applying the
Guidelines there is considerably more flexibility to raise mitigating
arguments than in the past. Pepper made explicit that its “without
limitation” language applies not only when a court is considering the
242
§ 3553(a) factors, but also at the Guidelines calculation stage.
Thus, if the language of a Guidelines’ commentary, application note,

Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523,
535 (2007) (explaining that the Guidelines had such an impact on judges because
they cognitively anchored the complex task of determining an offender’s sentence to
a starting point created by the Guidelines’ numerical framework).
238. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
1B1.4 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006))).
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (directing sentencing courts that “in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, [they] shall consider . . . the kinds of sentence
and the [Guidelines] sentencing range”).
240. Id. § 3553 (a)(1), (2)(D).
241. See, e.g., id. § 3553(a)(6) (listing “need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities” as a factor that allows a defendant to argue how his sympathetic social
history is different than a defendant who received a lengthy sentence for the same
offense).
242. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (“In determining the sentence to impose within the
guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court
may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.”
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661))
(emphasis added).))).
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or policy statement limits a mitigating argument, it is entitled to little
243
or no weight.
This frees up white collar defense counsel to view sentencings from
an entirely new perspective, focusing much less on the Guidelines’
proscriptions and much more on the development and presentation
of mitigation evidence. Advocates must now consider the entire
panoply of mitigating circumstances surrounding a client. The ABA
Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines are an excellent place to start,
but the development of mitigation evidence is bounded only by an
244
advocate’s imagination. It is critical for counsel to think creatively
about all aspects of their white collar clients—not just the details of
their crime and how much exposure they have at sentencing, but who
they are as individuals and what shaped their experiences leading up
to the moment they will be sentenced. All mitigating arguments
should be marshaled and presented at sentencing to create a
complete picture of the defendant and the impact of the sentence
245
imposed. In other words, think Kaczynski’s defense, not Madoff’s.
This requires a significant change in how most white collar defense
attorneys think about the law, their role as an advocate, and the
relationship with the client they represent. As one mitigation expert
246
has put it, “[s]ay good-bye to business as usual.”
243. See id. at 1247 (rejecting argument that policy statement precludes
consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation by stating that the Court’s post-Booker
decisions demonstrate that a court can impose a non-Guidelines sentence when it
disagrees with the Commission’s policy views). The Court further stated that
imposing a non-Guidelines sentence is especially appropriate when “the
[Sentencing] Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not
reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.” Id. (citation omitted).
Indeed, it would be difficult for a court to refuse to consider mitigation evidence
when calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range, and then a few seconds later take
that rejected evidence into account when determining whether a variance from the
range is appropriate. See id. at 1229 (indicating that all mitigating information may
be considered at all times up until the court determines a sentence).
244. See Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 656–83 (listing more than forty mitigating
factors broken into four categories: (1) good character factors; (2) crime
involvement factors; (3) legal proceedings factors; and (4) disease theory factors);
Pamela Blume Leonard, A New Profession for an Old Need: Why a Mitigation Specialist
Must Be Included on the Capital Defense Team, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1143, 1145–46 (2003)
(explaining that there is no comprehensive list of mitigating factors, but listing
eighteen factors advocates should consider, which are taken primarily from the ABA
Guidelines).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (directing the sentencing court to consider all of the
philosophical justifications for sentencing—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation —as well as the parsimony principle).
246. Natman Schaye & Roseann Schaye-Glos, Mitigation in the Death Belt—Twelve
Steps to Savings Clients’ Lives, CHAMPION, July 2005, at 18, 18; see also CAIT CLARKE ET
AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING ADVOCACY 2–3 (2003),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
tenprinciplestosentadv.pdf (discussing how sentencing advocacy is individualized).
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B. Strategy 2—Employ a Team Approach
To effectively develop mitigation evidence, capital attorneys rely on
a team approach to defending clients. This is one of the most
important strategies used in capital mitigation, and it is one of the
most straightforward for white collar counsel to adopt. The ABA
Guidelines instruct that capital teams should be comprised of no
fewer than two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist,
at least one of whom (most likely the mitigation specialist) should be
247
qualified to screen for mental or psychological disorders. The ABA
Guidelines make clear that the mitigation specialist holds a special
position on the defense team, and her role cannot be substituted with
248
an investigator or junior attorney.
The reasons for employing a team approach in capital cases are
practical: A single lawyer, despite his many strengths, does not have
the time nor the expertise to adequately prepare for the guilt and
penalty phases of a case that involves a thorough investigation of
249
mitigating evidence. Properly developing a mitigation case requires
potentially hundreds of hours of one-on-one interviews by someone
trained to “delve into the defendant’s past to unearth
circumstances . . . that might be used to paint a sympathetic picture
250
and sway a jury toward leniency.”
A lawyer busy interviewing
witnesses, analyzing documents, and arguing legal motions in
preparation for trial will simply not have time to develop mitigation
evidence to be used during sentencing. Even if the lawyer somehow
had the time, he does not possess the right skill set to complete a
mitigation investigation. Attorneys do not have the “experience nor
the training necessary to recognize every potential mitigating factor
251
when examining a defendant’s records or interviewing a witness.”
247. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES guideline 10.4(C)(2)(a)–(b) (rev. ed. 2003).
248. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 680–81 (setting forth guideline
4.1, which states that defense counsel has a duty to their client to include a
mitigation specialist on the defense team); see also Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note
246, at 19 (concluding that a lawyer cannot “fulfill” the role of a mitigation specialist
because they have different skills, training, and abilities); Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation,
supra note 37, at 249 (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323–24 (1983)) (distinguishing
the different role the mitigation specialist plays in a capital defense team in
investigating the client’s past).
249. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 19.
250. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1143.
251. Daniel L. Payne, Building the Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity
and a Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 49 (2003); see Craig Haney, The Social Context
of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
547, 605–06 (1995) (stating that “the task of compiling background and social
history information is so foreign to criminal defense work generally”); Russell
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Put another way, “[l]aw school prepares one to be an advocate, not
252
Further, clients and witnesses “widely
an investigator[.]”
253
Defendants and their
consider[] [attorneys] to be intimidating.”
families, the main source for mitigating evidence, often initially
distrust their counsel and are therefore less likely to divulge
embarrassing or sensitive information that could be key to a
254
mitigation case.
The reasons for using the team approach in capital cases apply
equally in white collar cases. While a four-person team may not be
possible in every white collar matter, it should be the starting point
for case staffing, not the exception. Realistically, most white collar
cases handled by large or medium-sized firms will have at least six
attorneys of varying experience levels assigned to the case, as well as a
slew of paralegals and case managers. Finding room for an
investigator and a mitigation specialist (who often work at lower rates
255
than even first-year attorneys) should not create a hardship.
Stetler, Why Capital Cases Require Mitigation Specialists, available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Library/document_search?batch_size%
3Aint=20&nlada_weighted_searchable_text=mitigation (last visited Aug. 28, 2012)
[hereinafter Stetler, Mitigation Specialists]. Stetler argues that:
Evidence presented in a typical trial is designed to answer questions
relating to discrete events such as whether the car went through a red light
at the time of the accident or whether defendant had the intent to kill at
the time he fired the fatal shot. Mitigating evidence, on the other hand,
deals with broad stretches of history. In order to explain the kind of
person the defendant is and the reason for his crime, witnesses may need
to testify to the defendant’s entire life, including events occurring before
he was born. To present such evidence effectively, counsel should review a
great mass of material to identify witnesses and events that will make the
defendant’s life meaningful to the sentencer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
252. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 252 (observing that a
“mitigation specialist investigates a different factual universe and needs a wholly
different set of skills” than a lawyer); Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don’t: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L.
359, 364 (1997) (recognizing that without a mitigation specialist “the defendant
probably has little or no chance of avoiding the death sentence unless the defense
[team] gives the jury something to counter both the horror of the crime and the
limited information the prosecution has introduced about the defendant”).
253. Payne, supra note 251, at 49.
254. Id. Lawyers are not the only members of the defense team that lack the
necessary skills to investigate mitigation evidence. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation,
supra note 37, at 248–49 (“A significant legal blind spot exists between the roles
played by the private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard informationgetters in the trial process. Neither one [is] suited to the task at hand here—namely
discovering and then communicating the complex human reality of the defendant’s
personality in a sympathetic way.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Betsy
Wilson, Creating a Capital-Defense Team That is More Than the Sum of its Parts,
CORNERSTONE, May-Aug. 2010, at 2, 2 (discussing the barriers between various
professions working together).
255. See Leonard, supra note 244, at 1154 (arguing that a mitigation specialist
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A white collar team, regardless of its size, must include an
experienced mitigation specialist. The fundamental task of the
mitigation specialist is to conduct a comprehensive social history
investigation of the defendant and identify all areas of relevant
mitigation, often through one-on-one interviews with the defendant
256
The Supplementary
and his family, friends, and acquaintances.
Guidelines set forth in detail the qualifications a mitigation specialist
257
must have and how mitigation evidence is developed, but the
following provides a concise summary that white collar counsel may
use as a guide:
Counsel’s duty . . . to thoroughly investigate the background and
circumstances of the client’s life and to present all relevant
mitigating evidence mandates the conducting of an extensive life
history study, as well as an analysis of the factors and forces that
influenced the client’s development, including personality and
behavior. The history must be multi-generational in nature,
assessing the effects of heredity and the inter-generational
transmissions of patterns of behavior, and must be broad in scope.
It involves investigation that goes beyond the individual, family,
school, and neighborhood to include an examination of socioeconomic, political, cultural, and environmental influences in the
client’s life.
The social history investigation and psycho-social assessment
should be conducted by a professional with skills and expertise not
generally possessed by attorneys. It should be done by someone
with an understanding of child and human development, including
the manner in which development is influenced and the person
shaped by heredity and environment. Skills in interviewing and
information gathering, including the collection and analysis of life
history records, are essential.
The interviewing techniques
employed in the social history investigation are different from
those generally taught in law schools and employed by lawyers.
Knowledge regarding human development and factors affecting it
are necessary in order to know what questions to ask, what
information to obtain, and how to make sense of that information.

provides more reliable procedures); Payne, supra note 251, at 50 (arguing that
appointing a mitigation specialist ultimately saves money). As a frame of reference,
the last white collar case the author was involved in defending at a large Chicago firm
was staffed with two capital partners, an income partner, a senior associate, a midlevel associate, a junior associate, a paralegal, and two case managers. The client also
had local counsel consisting of at least two attorneys and an assistant. Each of the
two co-defendants had similarly staffed legal teams.
256. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1145.
257. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 682 (guidelines 5.1(B) and
(C)).
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An awareness of the indicators of such things as cognitive
impairments, mental illness, childhood abuse and trauma, and
substance abuse and dependence is essential.
The person
conducting interviews must have the skills and expertise to assist
the client, family members, and others in disclosing private,
258
shameful, and sensitive information.

The professional most qualified to perform these duties is a
259
mitigation specialist.
A mitigation specialist’s ability to identify mental illness,
psychological disorders, and the symptoms of addiction cannot be
overlooked. White collar offenders, despite their perceived status
and success, suffer from many of the same disorders as others
260
committing crimes.
Studies have also identified specific negative
personality traits common to white collar criminals, such as low
261
behavioral self-control, high hedonism, and high narcissism.
“It

258. Jill Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1117, 1127–28
(2003); see also SENTENCING PROJECT, THE THINKING ADVOCATE’S LIST OF MITIGATING
FACTORS (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
listofmitigatingfactors.pdf (referencing a list of mitigating factors to be used by a
capital defense team).
259. See Miller, supra note 258, at 1128 (discussing a study in which lawyers
stressed the importance of mitigation specialists).
260. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 543 (setting forth common psychiatric
impairments of white-collar criminals). Almost half of the federal prison population
suffers from some sort of mental health problem. See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E.
GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES 2 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Press_
September_2006&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentI
D=38175 (indicating in a 2006 study that over 70,000 federal inmates, approximately
forty-five percent, suffered from mental health problems). Each year, fraud
offenders, which include white collar defendants, account for approximately
fourteen percent of all offenders sentenced in federal court. See 2010 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 214, fig.A (including the categories of fraud and non-fraud white collar
offenders, as defined by the Sentencing Commission). Of those sentenced,
approximately sixty-eighty percent receive a term of imprisonment. See id. tbl.12
(averaging the total percentages of those offenders receiving a sentence of
imprisonment in fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax, and
money laundering cases). It would be surprising then if white collar offenders did
not make up a sizable group of prison inmates that have been identified as suffering
from mental health problems. This conclusion is supported by the reflections of
many federal judges. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Judge in Famous “Rosie D” Case Reflects:
“What
Are
People
for?”,
WBUR
(Dec.
12,
2011,
1:50
PM),
http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2011/12/rosie-d-judge. Judge Michael A. Ponsor
commented, “I can tell you from experience that a solid majority of the adults that
come before me in federal court as criminal defendants suffer from mental health
disorders that can easily be traced to childhood and that are directly linked to the
adult’s criminal behavior.” Id.
261. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 543 (discussing psychiatric profiles of
white collar criminals). Cornell Medical School Professor Robert B. Millman has
identified a psychological dysfunction specific to the wealthy, including athletes and
politicians, called acquired situational narcissism. See Stephen Sherrill, The Year In
Ideas:
A to Z.; Acquired Situational Narcissism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2001),
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has been theorized that [white collar criminals] are charismatic, have
a need-to-control, have a tendency to bully subordinates, fear losing
their status and position, exhibit narcissistic tendencies, and lack
262
integrity and a social conscience.”
In specific cases, such as
Madoff’s, white collar offenders have been diagnosed as
263
sociopathic. It takes a skilled mitigation specialist to identify these
personality traits, draw them out for investigation, and then develop
264
them into a compelling mitigating factor to be used at sentencing.
None of that can be done if a mitigation specialist is not included on
the white collar defense team.
C. Strategy 3—Begin Mitigation Work Early
Thoroughly developing mitigation evidence to be used at
sentencing is a long and work-intensive process. The days are gone
when defense counsel could wait until the presentence report was
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/09/magazine/the-year-in-ideas-a-to-z-acquiredsituational-narcissism.html (explaining that like classical narcissism, the personality
disorder has symptoms of lack of empathy, grandiose fantasies, excessive need for
approval, rage, social isolation, and depression). “[F]or the acquired situational
narcissists . . . [t]heir marriages fall apart, they make lousy parents, they take copious
quantities of drugs, they get into trouble with the law. ‘Because they truly don’t
believe the world is real . . . they begin to think they’re invulnerable.’” Sherrill,
supra.
262. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 542 (discussing the characteristics of the
typical white-collar offender). See generally Tage Alalehto, Economic Crime: Does
Personality Matter?, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2003)
(studying the effect of personality traits on economic crimes); Drew Feeley, Article,
Personality, Environment, and the Causes of White-Collar Crime, 30 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 201
(2006) (discussing the research and theories on the behavioral and environmental
causes of white collar crime).
263. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 435 (discussing how sociopathic individuals can
charm others into schemes); Ackerman, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing whether
Madoff has sociopathic tendencies). But see Ernest Poortinga et al., A Case Control
Study: White-Collar Defendants Compared with Defendants Charged with Other Nonviolent
Theft, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 82, 87 (2006) (finding white collar criminals did
not have substantially higher rates of bipolar depression than a control group of
defendants charged with nonviolent thefts).
264. It is important for a mitigation specialist to identify a client suffering from a
mental health condition for a number of reasons. First, a history of a mental health
disorder may lessen the defendant’s culpability in the judge’s eyes if that condition
contributed to the defendant’s criminal conduct. Because judges often doubt
mental health claims, a mitigation specialist offers corroboration through
multigenerational one-on-one interviews with the defendant’s family and a review of
the relevant medical records. If no mental health issue was ever documented, a
mitigation specialist may be able to demonstrate that clear symptoms were present
despite a lack of documented treatment. Second, a mental health disorder may
disrupt the team’s ability to effectively communicate with the client. For example,
answers that appear evasive or guarded may be a symptom of an underlying mental
health issue the mitigation specialist can identify. Finally, a mitigation specialist can
ferret out untrue or exaggerated claims of mental health disorders or drug and
alcohol dependence that some white collar clients might make to justify their
conduct. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 254–58.
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issued, gather a handful of supporting letters from family and friends,
and prepare a sentencing memorandum to be filed a couple of weeks
265
When the Guidelines were
before the sentencing hearing.
mandatory and there were few mitigation arguments to be made, this
approach might have been sufficient. Now, mitigation must be
integrated into the entire defense case, and its development begins
the minute the client walks through the door. With over ninety
266
percent of fraud cases charged ending in a sentencing hearing,
there is no reason to wait —mitigation evidence will be necessary in
practically every federal white collar case.
The significant time it takes to adequately investigate and develop
mitigation evidence stems from the method of conducting the
defendant’s social history investigation. A social history inquiry is
intended to be an “unparalleled investigation into [the defendant’s]
personal and family history,” including their medical, educational,
267
correctional, and employment history.
That level of investigation
takes time. More specifically, each of the two aspects of the
investigation—record gathering and in-person interviews—require
many hours of dedicated work.
As white collar defense attorneys well understand, “[i]t is nearly
impossible to have lived in this day and age without leaving a long
268
paper trail.”
A complete investigation of mitigation evidence
attempts to uncover all records relevant to the defendant beginning
269
at the moment of conception. While that level of investigation may
not be feasible in every white collar case, it is important to gather
documents relating to all stages of the defendant’s life, because each
may have a mitigating story to tell or lead to critical mitigation
evidence. A partial list of documents that should be gathered
includes: medical records such as birth records, childhood illnesses
and check-ups, immunizations, mental health records, accidents and
265. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)–(g) (requiring objections be made within fourteen
days of receiving the sentencing memorandum and requiring the probation officer
to submit a report seven days before the hearing).
266. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008-STATISTICAL
TABLES tbls.4.1 & 5.1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf.
267. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003) (quoting Stetler, Mitigation
Evidence, supra note 15, at 35.).
268. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20.
269. See GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 cmt. (outlining that counsel has a duty to
thoroughly investigate defendant’s history and criminal conduct); O’Brien, When Life
Depends on It, supra note 37, at 728–30 (highlighting the importance of conducting
interviews with those people familiar with the defendant’s life).
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injuries, psychiatric records, and substance abuse reports; school
records, such as report cards, psychological testing, health and
disciplinary records, diplomas, and awards and honors; social service
records, such as welfare, foster care, and adoption; criminal records,
both juvenile and adult; employment records, such as resumes,
promotion and demotions, certifications, and human resources files;
financial records, such as bank accounts, investment accounts, tax
returns, business records, and business licenses; social and
philanthropic giving records, such as membership documents,
donation receipts, and volunteer logs; military records; and
270
immigration records.
Records collection does not stop with the
defendant; family, friends, and acquaintances must all be canvassed
for relevant documents, and a multigenerational search may be
271
necessary.
It is especially important to begin locating document
sources early because records can take months to arrive and some
records can only be obtained after personal meetings with the record
272
holder.
273
In addition to record gathering, “everyone must be interviewed.”
274
This “daunting, but necessary task”
generally begins with an
interview of the defendant and then radiates outward to his family,
275
The
friends, neighbors, business associates, and acquaintances.
idea is for the mitigation specialist to create a complete biography of
the defendant’s life through a cyclical process of interviewing those
276
with whom he has come in contact.
Veteran mitigation specialists
describe the interview process as follows:

270. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1146–47. In addition to paper documents,
defense teams are now scouring social media for mitigating evidence, even using
social media websites such as Facebook and MySpace as platforms to “crowd source”
its collection. See Ken Strutin, The Role of Social Media in Sentencing Advocacy, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 29, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle
LTN.jsp?id=1202472638649&slreturn=1 (County Commissioner Greg Skrepenak,
who was convicted of federal corruption charges, asked his Facebook friends to send
character references to his counsel or the judge prior to his sentencing.).
271. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20 (finding that it is “critical to
obtain records for as many generations as possible” and this can be especially
challenging if a defendant has a history of mental illness).
272. See id. (explaining that military and Social Security records may take up to a
year to locate, request, and receive, and sometimes the only way to obtain records is
by requesting them in-person so the record-holder feels compelled to provide them).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 726–28 (emphasizing
the importance of interviewing everyone who has ever known the defendant); Payne,
supra note 251, at 46 (noting that a proper mitigation investigation starts with
interviewing the family).
276. Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 38. The process is “cyclical,
rather than linear, because witnesses will [often] need to be re-interviewed when new
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The investigation is not complete until the information uncovered
becomes redundant and provides no new insight. It is insufficient
to talk to witnesses only once because each new individual recalls
different facts and anecdotes; if an aunt provides an account of [a
mitigating factor] which the mother forgot to mention, it is
necessary to go back to the mother and ask about it. Similarly, an
interview may reveal records that must be obtained, which in turn
raise new questions, questions which necessitate interviewing
277
several witnesses again.

Interviews must be conducted in-person, one-on-one, and usually
in the interviewee’s home to establish trust, as well as to give the
mitigation specialist an opportunity to observe non-verbal cues that
278
could indicate further avenues of investigation.
In a complex case, the interview process may involve hundreds of
hours of work requiring “meticulous attention to detail,” painstaking
efforts to decipher references, and “patience and sensitivity in
279
eliciting disclosures.”
Although the process can be arduous for a
white collar defense team, it is singularly important because “the
defendant’s personal history and family life, his obsessions,
aspirations, hopes, and flaws” —the heart of a mitigating social
history to be presented at sentencing — ”are rarely a matter of
280
physical evidence.” Beginning the social history investigation early
ensures mitigation evidence will be fully developed in time to be used
281
throughout the case.
D. Strategy 4—Better Understand Your Client by Building Trust
How many white collar defense attorneys truly understand their
clients—their motivations, aspirations, and fears? How many can
effectively communicate their client’s unique humanity to the
sentencing judge in a way that compels sympathy? Capital counsel,
through the inclusion of mitigation specialists on the defense team,
have been at the forefront of client-centered sentencing— not just
information is discovered.” Id.
277. Id. (quoting Lee Norton, Capital Cases: Mitigation Investigations, CHAMPION,
May 1992, at 43, 45).
278. Id. at 39; see O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 747 (noting
that mitigation specialists recognize that as much as sixty-five percent of what is
communicated by a witness is nonverbal).
279. Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 39.
280. Stetler, Mitigation Specialists, supra note 251.
281. An additional benefit of beginning the social history investigation early is that
it will aid in plea negotiations and may help uncover possible prosecution arguments
to be used at trial or during sentencing. See Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15,
at 35 n.1 (acknowledging the role that social history investigation had in Kaczynski’s
plea to avoid the death sentence).
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effective representation from a legal standpoint, but a type of
representation that genuinely endeavors to understand and articulate
to the court the complete person being sentenced. For white collar
counsel to do the same, to fully explain the “background, character
and conduct of the defendant,” they must build a level of trust with
282
the client that is not currently the norm.
The reasons most white collar counsel lack this level of trust, and
therefore lack a comprehensive understanding of their client to
present to the court, are familiar. An attorney immersed in pre-trial
investigation or trial preparation does not have the time or the
training to establish a rapport with the client that allows for the
283
unguarded discussions necessary to build genuine trust. Moreover,
most white collar counsel, despite what they may say, do not really
want to—their training and experience has taught them to view
client trust as a one-way street, in which the client is to trust the
lawyer completely, but the lawyer constantly weighs the client’s
statements for truth and consistency against known evidence. While
this may be necessary to be an effective advocate, it is difficult to
achieve a superior level of client trust necessary to develop mitigation
evidence under these circumstances.
The solution is to use a mitigation specialist as a client liaison.
Mitigation specialists have the time and the training to talk to the
client in a way that most attorneys do not. Mitigation specialists
approach their interactions with witnesses, including the client, in a
284
manner that conveys warmth and friendliness.
They ask
“innocuous biographical questions about [the client], his family, his
285
Because
well-being, [and the] routine aspects of his daily life.”
mitigation specialists spend potentially hundreds of hours with the
client and his family and friends conducting a social history
investigation, they know when the client is feeling agitated, scared,
ignored, or falsely confident, as well as whether the client is telling
286
the truth or shading it.
Mitigation specialists also know when to
push a client and when to back off, and how to explain to the client
that investigating mitigation evidence or exploring a plea agreement

282. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011).
283. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 19–20.
284. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 748.
285. Id.
286. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20 (noting that a “relationship of
trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client’s natural resistance to
disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an effective
penalty phase defense” (quoting GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE
OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.5 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003))).
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287

does not mean giving up on guilt or innocence. Most importantly,
mitigation specialists become the client’s truest advocate within the
defense team, allowing others to test evidence without destroying
288
client trust. The result is a white collar defense team fully invested
in the client’s defense and able to “inspire compassion” at
289
sentencing.
E. Strategy 5—Develop the Most Persuasive Mitigation Evidence
The breadth of possible mitigating evidence bearing on a capital
290
case is astounding. Mitigation specialists have identified expansive
theories of mitigation to take advantage of Lockett’s holding that a
“sentencer . . . [can]not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and
291
any of the circumstances of the offense . . . .”
This allows a capital
defense team almost unlimited avenues to pursue when developing a
mitigation case. In practice, however, some mitigation arguments
resonate with juries better than others. Capital defense attorneys
understand that to be effective, a mitigation case must focus not just
292
The
on any mitigation evidence but on the right kinds of evidence.
same applies to the use of mitigation in white collar cases.
Fortunately, a body of empirical evidence is available to help guide
white collar attorneys in determining which specific mitigating
293
arguments will best persuade a sentencing judge.
Although every
287. See Leonard, supra note 244, at 1150 (pointing out that a mitigation specialist
can “assist the defense counsel in explaining the value of a negotiated plea and the
risks of a capital trial to the defendant and his family”); O’Brien, When Life Depends on
It, supra note 37, at 749–50 (“The effective interviewer is an ‘empathic listener,’ who
‘puts [the client] at ease, is sensitive to his suffering, and expresses his [or her]
compassion.’ The interviewer’s attitude is critical to full and frank disclosure; she
must listen non-judgmentally, and ‘elicit data . . . [while] encouraging the patient to
tell his or her story.’” (footnote omitted)).
288. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 744.
289. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 261.
290. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1145–46. For a list of mitigation factors, see
generally Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 656–83.
291. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis added).
292. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21 (noting that mitigation
specialists analyze the importance of different mitigating information in terms of its
potential impact).
293. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1043–44 (1995). This series of studies, known as the
Capital Juror Project, is a multijurisdictional analysis of how capital juries make their
sentencing decisions. Id.; Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital
Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538–39 (1998). The
backbone of the studies is a three to four-hour interview of up to 120 capital jurors in
each of the participating eight states. Bowers, supra, at 1043. Jurors are interviewed
about their views of the crime, the defendant, the victim, the victim’s family, jury
deliberations, the conduct of counsel, and the jurors’ background. Garvey, supra, at
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sentencer may be swayed to differing degrees, the data points to a
number of general principles. First, the defendant should express
294
Sentencers credit defendants who are
remorse for his crime.
295
contrite and demonstrate they would not commit future crimes.
Second, residual doubt over the defendant’s guilt is a powerful
296
mitigating factor. Although residual doubt is not mitigation in the
strict sense, a defendant who raises doubt about his guilt, or at least
297
about his culpability, improves his standing at sentencing.
Third,
mitigating arguments that focus on “factors that diminish the
defendant’s individual responsibility for his actions” have a positive
298
impact at sentencing.
Sentencers attach “significant mitigating
potential” to circumstances demonstrating the defendant’s
diminished mental capacity, such as history of mental health
299
problems, at the time of the offense.
Defendants who suffered as
children, and therefore are seen to have lesser responsibility, are also
credited by sentencers, as are defendants who sought help for their
300
problems but were unable to get it.
However, sentencers have
“little patience” for defendants who attribute their wrongdoing solely
301
to drugs or alcohol.
White collar defense teams can use these
findings to focus their broadly investigated mitigation evidence to
302
have maximum effect.

1538. Although a capital jury’s views may not be a perfect proxy for the views of
individual district court judges sentencing white-collar defendants, the Project serves
as the best available indicator of the efficacy of mitigation arguments made before a
sentencer. The findings are supported by surveys of federal judges conducting
sentencings. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGES: JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.13 (2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.
pdf (surveying judges’ responses to characteristics of a defendant at sentencing).
294. See Garvey, supra note 293, at 1567 (suggesting that defendants should show
some remorse for their conduct).
295. See id. (recommending that the defendant express to the jury he will not “do
it again”).
296. See id. at 1563 (noting that the most effective mitigating evidence raises doubt
about the defendant’s guilt).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1539.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 290–301 and accompanying text. White collar defense teams
should not try to steer the mitigation investigation toward one of the “high impact”
factors, however, as doing so would likely artificially limit the breadth and character
of the mitigation evidence discovered. Id. Instead, the mitigation expert should
conduct an exhaustive investigation, present all possible avenues of mitigation to the
defense team, and then the team can collectively decide which mitigating arguments
to raise at sentencing based partly on the empirical data discussed above. Schaye &
Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21.
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Strategy 6—Present a Compelling Mitigation Case at Sentencing

To be effective, a comprehensive and consistent mitigation case
must be presented to the sentencing judge in a compelling way.
Although most white collar defense attorneys are adept at presenting
arguments and evidence in motions and through trial testimony, they
often fall short during sentencing. Much of this is due to mindset —
white collar counsel often have the idea that a sentencing consists of
303
a memorandum to be argued at a simple hearing.
Instead, white
collar counsel must view sentencings as capital litigators do —as a
continuing and co-equal phase of the case that requires a tightly
304
orchestrated presentation of mitigating evidence.
As an initial matter, mitigation should be considered as part of the
overall strategy of a case, not simply as an afterthought to the trial or
plea negotiation phase. Because the stakes are so high in death
penalty cases, capital counsel understand that opportunities to
present mitigation evidence must be maximized.
Therefore,
mitigation themes are developed and presented whenever possible
305
throughout all phases of a case.
This means that a mitigating
narrative is woven into every interaction with the government or the
court, creating a consistent and compelling picture of the defendant
306
as a whole person. For example, Kaczynski’s defense team stressed
303. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 23 (stating that attorneys should
try not to “justify or excuse the crime” but explain it by developing a compelling
picture of the client’s life). The risk is especially high when sentencing comes after a
guilty plea. If the Guidelines range as calculated by the probation department is
uncontested or there are only a few offense levels at issue, counsel sometimes views
the sentencing hearing as pro forma. Nothing could be less true. Despite a plea
agreement, the court is required to sentence the defendant after hearing all
information related to his background, character, and conduct. See Pepper v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (holding that courts must consider all mitigating
evidence). Further, most plea agreements in white collar cases leave open some
opportunity to argue for sentencing at the low end of the range, for the application
of particular specific offense characteristics, or even for variances, all of which
provide counsel the opportunity to argue mitigation consistent with § 3553(a).
304. See Norton, supra note 277, at 45 (“The data must be integrated in such a way
as to explain why the offense occurred and how all the factors came together to
bring your client to the point of [committing that offense] . . . . More important,
you must explain why other [similarly situated persons] . . . did not [commit the
offense].”).
305. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21 (“Counsel should seek a
[mitigation] theory that will be effective in connection with both guilt and penalty,
and should seek to minimize inconsistencies. The theme must be consistently
applied to obtain resources, pursue motions, exclude evidence, [or] secure a plea
agreement . . . .”).
306. See Haney, supra note 26, at 844 (“A mitigating counter-narrative that
incorporates a capital defendant’s social history and immediate life circumstances is
now recognized as the centerpiece of an effective [capital case.]”); Sean D. O’Brien,
Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life Saving Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 831, 836
(2009) (stating that “[t]he mitigation narrative must be presented in dealings with
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his mental health condition (paranoid schizophrenia) at every
307
This helped persuade the
possible opportunity prior to trial.
government to accept Kaczynski’s guilty plea to a life sentence in a
308
seemingly certain death penalty case.
White collar counsel can do the same by previewing mitigating
evidence whenever possible. For example, counsel should consider
weaving mitigation evidence into a pre-indictment white paper or an
309
attorney’s proffer to the government.
Counsel may also consider
seeking medical evaluations of their client early in a case if there is
310
any indication of mental health problems or addiction.
Precisely
when to share this type of information is a strategic decision for
counsel, but it can be advantageous to present mitigation evidence
early. In any event, mitigation themes cannot wait to be developed
until the sentencing hearing. By then, it is difficult to alter the
311
court’s perception of the defendant and his culpability.
In terms of the practical side of presenting mitigation evidence,
capital defense counsel use two primary strategies that can be easily
adopted by white collar attorneys. First, in preparation for presenting
a mitigation case, a capital defense team will “triangulate” mitigating
312
data to ensure maximum thoroughness, accuracy, and reliability.
“Triangulation of data refers to obtaining data from more than one
313
source and, preferably from more than one type of source.” In an
ideal world, counsel would support all mitigating arguments with

the prosecutor, selecting and instructing the jury, and the guilt/innocence stage of
trial,” in addition to the penalty phase).
307. See Finnegan, supra note 12, at 58 (reporting that if the case had gone to trial,
Kaczynski’s defense team would have offered evidence of multiple generational
mental illness).
308. See Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 35, 36 n.1 (observing that the
successful disposition was dependent on “tireless mitigation investigation”).
309. See Howard Sklamberg, What Really Works with Federal Prosecutors, NAT’L L.J.
(Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005447640
(discussing benefits of attorney proffer and most effective way to conduct one).
310. See generally Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 49 (providing a
comprehensive discussion of mental health testing and strategic decisions regarding
its use).
311. See Haney, supra note 26, at 837–43 (explaining the prevalence and
intractability of the crime master narrative in criminal cases); Ellen S. Podgor, The
Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 740 (2007)
(arguing that lack of sympathy from the general public makes white collar offenders
“easy targets” for increased punishment); David Porter, Lawyer Gets Longest-Ever
Insider Trading Sentence, BOSTON.COM (June 4, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/articles/2012/06/04/2_set_for_sentencing_in_insider_trading_case (former
attorney sentenced to twelve years for insider trading scheme after judge called him
“amoral” and “thuggish,” comparing him to drug dealer).
312. Norton, supra note 277, at 45.
313. Id.
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314

documentary evidence, lay testimony, and expert testimony.
For
example, to present evidence of a defendant’s gambling addiction,
white collar counsel could “triangulate” the data by developing
testimony about the defendant’s addiction from his family (lay
testimony), his doctor or an addiction specialist (expert testimony),
315
This
and through his financial records (documentary evidence).
approach is especially important because expert witnesses are often
looked upon as “hired guns” —supporting their opinion-based
testimony with first-hand accounts by family members and hard
documents creates a consistent and compelling mitigation
316
argument.
If a sentencing judge will not allow a full hearing in
which to present mitigating evidence, affidavits may serve as a
317
substitute for live testimony.
Second, capital defense counsel evaluate mitigation evidence they
intend to present under the “Four Cs”:
credibility,
318
comprehensiveness, consistency, and comprehensibility. Mitigation
evidence is credible when all mitigation theories are supported by a
thorough social history investigation backed-up by documents, lay
319
witness testimony, and expert witness testimony. A mitigation case
is comprehensive when it has been applied at every stage of the

314. See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 725–31 (demonstrating
the key components of an optimal mitigation investigation).
315. Triangulation of data can also be compellingly used for positive mitigation
evidence. For example, instead of simply offering letters explaining the defendant’s
good works (as most white collar defense attorneys do), counsel should support the
letters with tax returns showing giving totals and awards for service by charitable
organizations, as well as the testimony of one of the letter drafters. By triangulating a
single point of mitigating data, the entire “dataset” (all the sentencing letters) gains
legitimacy. If allowed by the court, an expert might also be called to testify as to the
defendant’s low risk of recidivism; part of the testimony might highlight the
defendant’s charitable works. It is difficult for a judge to disregard mitigating
evidence if it is supported by multiple pieces of evidence. The sheer time mitigation
evidence is in front of the court increases the chances the judge will consider it
during the final sentencing determination.
316. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Law Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1997) (noting that some
jurors perceive expert witnesses as “professional witnesses” being paid to testify
favorably).
317. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2) (allowing defendant to introduce evidence on
objections to the presentence investigation report).
318. See John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases: Principles of
Developing and Presenting Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, CHAMPION, Nov.
2000, at 63, 69 (“Jurors must understand your evidence before they can accept your
theory. They also must believe it. If they question the credibility of your evidence,
they will likely stop listening and start resisting your theory. Without doubt, for your
evidence to be understood (comprehensible) by jurors, it must have a reliable
foundation (credible), it must not come as a surprise (comprehensive) and it must not be
used as an excuse only after all else has failed (consistent).”).
319. Id. at 63.

HAUGH.TO_AUTHOR3 (DO NOT DELETE)

56

10/10/2012 2:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

defense, including during discussions with the client, meetings with
320
the government, in motions, and in court appearances. Consistent
use of mitigation evidence occurs when defense counsel has
formulated and communicated a “unified theory of the case that
takes into account all the facts and circumstances of the client and
321
the offense and tells the same story at every stage of the litigation.”
Mitigation evidence is comprehensible when it is presented in
322
ordinary language and in a common sense manner.
White collar
counsel should evaluate their mitigation case under the same rubric.
The fourth “C,” however, can be somewhat difficult to achieve
when presenting the results of a detailed social history investigation.
Experienced capital attorneys make liberal use of visual aids,
particularly photos, videos, and physical objects (e.g., trophies,
artwork, military medals), and key documents, such as earned
certificates, favorable press accounts, and letters of praise, to
323
humanize their clients. Demonstrative timelines of the client’s life
history and genograms depicting multigenerational afflictions may
324
The effective deployment of these types of
also be appropriate.
mitigation evidence in white collar cases is only limited by the
combined imagination of the defense team.
G. Strategy 7—Keep the Ultimate Goal in Mind
Finally, white collar counsel cannot lose sight of the ultimate goal
of mitigation—presenting the “diverse frailties of humankind” to the
court in a way that humanizes the client and evokes sympathy at
325
sentencing. This, however, does not mean mitigation evidence is a
defense to prosecution or a “reason the client should get away with

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 22.
324. Id. A demonstrative timeline likely starts as a chronology consisting of
narrative, historical accounts of the influences or events that have the most
significant effect on the client’s life. The chronology is continuously updated as new
data is found, allowing the defense team to quickly locate facts, documents, physical
evidence, and witnesses that are capable of communicating important aspects of the
client’s life story. The chronology is then converted into a demonstrative timeline.
See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 756–57 (discussing how
chronologies create a narrative of the defendant’s life and how “life history
diagrams” can be used during the penalty phase). Genograms are “annotated family
trees which depict the relationships between family members and patterns of
impairments” within the client’s family. Id. at 757 (quoting Norton, supra note 277,
at 45). They also help organize and display data “useful in explaining to juries the
long-term effects of various influences on the client.” Id.
325. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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326

it.” White collar counsel, particularly in today’s negative corporate
climate, must not be perceived as attempting to justify the crime
committed. Instead, mitigation should be viewed as a means of
introducing evidence “which inspires compassion” and indicates
327
capacity for redemption.
Put simply, mitigation is an explanation,
not an excuse.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a question and a goal. The question was
whether two federal defendants with seemingly nothing in common
other than their life terms—the nonviolent economic offender,
Bernie Madoff, and the remorseless serial killer, Ted Kaczynski —
could learn from one another when it came to federal sentencing
practices. Was there a lesson for the CEO from the case of the
condemned? The answer to that question is a certain “yes.” As seen
from the discussion of the development of the mitigation function in
capital cases— beginning with the Supreme Court’s Gregg decision
and culminating with the Supplementary Guidelines —capital litigators
and their teams of mitigation experts have mastered the use of
mitigating social history evidence to “inspire compassion” at
sentencing. Following a parallel arc, white collar sentencing has
undergone a series of seismic shifts, compelling counsel to develop
new strategies to address the schizophrenic character of federal
sentencing, which both subjects white collar offenders to harsh postBooker sentences and offers them opportunities to harness the
expansive judicial sentencing discretion as clarified in Pepper. The
two sentencing worlds, and the worlds of Madoff and Kaczynski,
merge over mitigation and its “transformative power” to impact a
defendant’s sentence.
This Article’s goal was to highlight new strategies and techniques
available to white collar defendants and their counsel through the
use of mitigation evidence and to enhance federal sentencing
advocacy as a whole. The first aspect of this goal was partially met by
discussing seven strategies capital counsel use so effectively—
adopting a mitigation mindset, employing a team approach,
beginning mitigation work early, better understanding the client by
building trust, developing the most persuasive mitigation evidence,
presenting a compelling mitigation case at sentencing, and keeping
the ultimate goal in mind. A deeper look at these and other key
326. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 261.
327. Id.
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mitigation strategies is warranted. Whether the second aspect of the
goal will be met remains to be seen. But if white collar attorneys do
in fact learn from their capital counterparts, employing mitigation
techniques in their cases and striving to understand and present their
clients as complete individuals, we can all be hopeful.

